CHAPTER 3

THE PROJECT

3.1 Introduction and Overview

32. This chapter describes the project and the various programmes and their institutional framework. The five activities represented in ITC by the six NGO's are described in brief detail and their strategies for the future discussed in the light of issues of quality, efficiency and relevance.[5] In general it is concluded that the programmes are relevant and responsive to the needs of their target groups, and are each well enough placed to react positively to the changes in the refugee situation which are currently taking place and likely to occur in the future. Chapter 4 below extends the detailed analysis of the programmes into the domains of management and finance.

33. The ITC is a consortium of six NGO's which have decided to group their activities in favour of assistance to Afghan displaced persons in one complex situated on the outskirts of Peshawar. The construction of the complex was assisted by the EC, and it is designed in such a way as to permit independent use of facilities by its occupying organisations. The consortium consists of the following NGO's:

- Solidarité Afghanistan Belge (SAB), with overall coordinating responsibility between the NGO's and the EEC;
- Aide Medicale Internationale Afghanistan, France (AMI-F);
- Aide Medicale Internationale, Section Belge (AMI-Belgique);
- SOS/PER GENTES – PRO GENTIBUS, Belgium (SOS/PG)
- Medical Refresher Course for Afghans, France (MRCA/CRMA);
- Sandy Gall's Afghanistan Appeal, UK (SGAA).

34. The organisation is governed by a convention signed in September 1989 by all parties, and by a subsequent addendum dated March 1990 providing for operational guidance on the application of the EC contract reference NA/AR/18/1989. SAB fully represents the consortium to the EC, and is the recipient of all payments issued by the EC in relation to the contract. SAB is also responsible for the management of the ITC common services in Hyatabad.

35. The projects run by the NGO's are all concerned with training in the areas of health, educational and trade skills. These training activities take place in a wide variety of training modes, but are all geared to either improving the social and economic positions of displaced Afghans in Pakistan or in Afghanistan itself. They cover

- SOS/PG: training of primary school teachers and of craft apprentices;

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[5] Fuller descriptions of each programme are to be found in the Funding Request to the EEC by Solidarité Afghanistan, dated December 1990.

- AMI & MRCA: training of health workers and curative activities;
- SGAA: training of orthopaedic technicians and physiotherapists, and treatment of the disabled.

36. This chapter is concerned witht the technical and professional aspects of the projects. Chapter 4 is concerned with policy and management. This chapter does not therefore discuss issues of management which, however, are to varying degrees important in any scheme of programme improvement. Of particular relevance as background to this chapter are the views of the mission on the need for the head offices of the NGO's to provide greater technical support and the desirability of reorienting the use of expatriates towards technical and professional activities and away from administration and basic management, which should be devolved upon local staff.

3.2 The Programmes – Past and Current Activities

3.2.1 SOS/PG/SAB – ASYAR

37. SOS/PG is responsible for two projects separately managed out of the ITC concerned with the training of primary school teachers and the training of craft apprentices. SOS/PG as an organisation has little contact with ITC Hyatabad, and SAB is effectively the managing NGO. The overall policy of the NGO in ITC is to undertake work in two areas: training for income generation and primary school teacher training. These activities reflect the organisation's concern that displaced Afghans gain access to education and skills which might otherwise not be open to them.

38. The training of apprentices takes place under the title of Apprenticeship for Young Afghan Refugees (ASYAR). ASYAR was initially aimed at young Afghan refugees between the ages of 12 and 15. This was found to be unsuccessful because they were too young, and the age range was increased to 15-21. For the more vulnerable groups, including widows, orphans and the disabled, the age range is 15-45 years of age.

39. The goal of ASYAR is to provide opportunities to displaced Afghans for income generation who otherwise have restricted access to the labour market. This is achieved through the organisation and financing of apprenticeship places in active workshops so that after a determined period the apprentice is able to earn income in his or her own right. Particular focus is on the most vulnerable groups, disabled persons, widows and orphans.

40. Some 27 trades are offered with training periods ranging from 7 to 17 months. They include motor mechanics, embroidery, radio and TV repair, carpentry, and tailoring, which account presently for over 50 per cent of trainees. Other major trades include bicycle repair, blacksmithing, 'denting' (body repair), tractor repair, watch repair and welding, accounting for about 20 per cent of trainees. A few of the offered trades (for example baking and photography) are not taken up. At present some 740 trainees are placed with masters in NWFP, administered through six sub-offices, as well as in the Punjab, administered through one sub-office in Mianwali.

41. There is currently a waiting list of over 300 applicants. When ASYAR plans to register new trainees an announcement is made in mosques and applicants are given a simple test and an interview. Each applicant registers a trade preference, and can make up to three choices. The total number of trainees has been based on quotas set out by UNHCR. Each month vacancies are reviewed and the next applicant on the waiting list for a particular trade is accepted. Vacancies occur either when an apprentice 'graduates' or when a new master is found. The nationalities of masters are divided equally between Afghan and

Pakistani. Upon accepting an apprentice a master is given a new toolkit with a maximum value of Rps 2,000. The apprentice receives a monthly stipend of Rps 300.

42. An agreement is signed in Pashtu, Farsi or Urdu between ASYAR and the master setting out rights and duties, and the parent or guardian of the apprentice signs an agreement. The first 11/2 months is probationary. Trainees work up to 10 hours per day, 6 days per week. A placement officer visits the work place twice a week throughout the duration of the training to check on the progress of the trainee and to sort out any problems that may have arisen between master and apprentice. The placement officers are not technical educators but have a general, often primary teaching, background. On completion of the training the apprentice is given a set of tools.

43. An unusual feature of the scheme is to be found in the motivation of the staff as well as of the masters. The solidarity and desire for mutual support among Afghan refugees is striking and their motivation is not restricted to economic motives. There is an awareness that by training future competitors masters are in danger of assisting in the over-supply relative to demand of craftsmen in their trades, but they appear to feel a moral duty to assist the refugees.

44. **Staff**. ASYAR has a total of 40 staff of which 15 are placement officers and advisers, 4 instructors (for radio and mechanics theory courses), and the rest administrative staff and drivers.

Discussion of ASYAR

45. The external efficiency of the scheme is high: about 15 per cent on average of graduate apprentices are recorded by the ASYAR monitoring officer as unemployed, though this is an over-estimate because graduates who are working but not in the trade for which they received training are considered as unemployed. This is correct when measuring external efficiency in a narrow sense, but it cannot always be assumed that they would have found work had they not followed the training: these substitution effects can be significant. In a broader sense the fact that they are earning income is sufficient. Average earnings per graduate are reported to be about Rps 800 per month, but this figure would need to be treated with caution.

46. There are, however, a number of issues of interest. These relate to possibilities for rationalising the length of training courses; assessing competence and strengthening the monitoring of training; measuring the access to and training of vulnerable groups; the issue of integration *vs* preparation for return; labour market analysis; and literacy.

47. **Rationalising Length of Training**. The determination of the length of apprenticeship training has evolved over the years on the basis of experience. It may be opportune to review the training periods on two grounds. First, in most cases the training provided, as is to be expected, is fairly basic. As with any apprentice programme the length of time taken to achieve full competence is measured in years. Thus, although the apprentices graduate and are capable of earning income, they continue to develop their skills, though many actually take charge of workshops. The extent of the competencies they develop appears to depend on their ability and that of their masters: there appears to be a wide variety of ability ranges among apprentices, and masters differ in their dynamism and the amount of business they generate.

48. Visits by the mission to a small sample of workshops prompted speculation on the marginal learning benefits of the last few months of some of the courses. In some cases apprentices had advanced so much that the masters were also paying salaries: in other cases the variety and type of work appeared to be restricted.

49. Secondly, a reduction in total months of some of the training periods would enable the waiting list to be reduced and more trainees to pass through the system, without in any way reducing external efficiency as measured by the percentage of the trainees gaining paid jobs at the end of their training. The opportunity cost of the last seven months of training in a 17 month course is one half trainee year for another trainee in a 12 month course (not allowing for extra tool costs). 115 trainees taking motor mechanics ('engine') amount to a total of nearly 2,000 trainee months. If the duration were to be reduced to 12 months about 700 trainee months would be released for new trainees. Consideration may therefore be given to standardising as far as possible the lengths of the training periods to 6 and 12 months, or at least reducing significantly the number of different course lengths from the current eight to, say, four. This would also have the added advantage of permitting easier programming and planning of the scheme.

50. **Assessing Competence**. The issue of reducing training period lengths is linked to the general issue of assessment of competence. Competence in this sense refers to skill achievement in each trade. In a more conventional apprenticeship scheme apprentices are judged on test pieces and are expected to demonstrate a complete range of competencies in each area of their trade. The ASYAR scheme, oriented as it is to income generation, should not have undue emphasis placed on conventional vocational training criteria, but it is in the interests to the trainees to receive as full a range of skills as possible: a trainee in carpentry who can only make doors but no tables is disadvantaged in the labour market.

51. The monitoring of the scheme concentrates on administrative and personnel issues, and there is only informal moderation of trainee competence. The answer to the question 'What is this trainee expected to know by month 2,4,6 ... the end of the period?' should be as specific as is possible in the circumstances. The real test of external efficiency will be over the longer term: will graduates who work for their ex-masters continue to thrive in the market place when they change workshops, for example.

52. One approach to this might be to modify the monitoring form and make it specific to each trade. Instead of using value rankings (bad, poor...very good) trainee monitoring could be based on competencies (has made mortice and tenon joint; bled brake fluid; diagnosed circuit faults; etc). A full list of desired competencies for each trade could focus the monitoring procedures on the quality of training and could also provide better justification for training period lengths than exist at present. It is useful to re-emphasise at the same time, however, that this type of informal sector income generation programme should be distinguished from 'vocational training' in the conventional sense, and that the suggestions contained in this section are not intended to 'formalise' the non-formal nature of the training: they are rather intended to improve access and quality, goals which are desirable in themselves and which should always be present.

53. **Vulnerable Groups**. The project document and other ASYAR literature lays stress on 'vulnerable social classes'. The March 1991 progress report gives the percentage of trainees from these groups as 28 per cent. Although the precise data are not known, the greater number of these are male disabled trainees, and the smallest number, probably single figures, is widows. As in all Afghan refugee programmes the issue of women is a sensitive one, but if the NGO is serious about attaining these goals, and if the policy is to be respected, then consideration may be given to how to improve the balance of vulnerable groups in the scheme as well as their overall share of the benefits of the programmes.

54. **Integration and Return to Afghanistan**. The emphasis of the programme is explicitly on income generation in the refugee context, and the mission is in sympathy with this overall policy (which is not clearly stated). However, as with the other programmes based in ITC, the issue of return to Afghanistan and of making training relevant to this, is becoming more important. Some thought has been given to this, as, for example, in the agricultural tools scheme, which was not in the end successful. The mission was not able, for obvious reasons, to make a judgement of the viability of training for return, and on the policy

and practice changes required to develop this, and this issue could therefore form part of the policy review suggested in Chapter 4.

55. **Labour Market Analysis**. Little appears to be known about the labour market in which trainees operate, and, as with informal sector programmes there is, rightly, a good deal of mystery.[6] However, if the programme continues over, say the next three years, and if the number of trainees is increased, somewhere in the region of 3,000 new graduates could be entering the labour market, and large part of them in the Peshawar area. Casual investigation during field visits revealed declining returns to small businesses over the last five years and in the case of tailoring the decline appeared quite substantial.[7] Theory would suggest that this phenomenon is to be expected. Some businesses, such as radio repair, show good margins because of low fixed and variable costs, and low working capital; others, such as carpentry and tailoring have high costs of working capital and compressed margins.

56. In principle it is to be expected that market developments would be reflected in the volume and nature of applications for training: individuals may perceive or hear of the relative returns to different types of trade. In practice in the Afghan situation this mechanism may not operate for a number of reasons. One of these is the restriction on the type of work disabled people can undertake. Another is the short term horizon of this type of income generating programme: in refugee camps survival is often the prime motivation.

57. A review of the trades offered in the light of these considerations with the object of providing a basic form of job counselling could be considered. More substantively, the geographical dispersion of trainees might spread labour market pressures more evenly. Again, this might form part of a policy review.

58. **Literacy**. It was noted that many apprentices (and masters) are illiterate. There are two reasons why this is of significance. First, there is evidence that literate people learn faster and better; and second, in some trades literacy is a positive direct advantage. For example, the painting trade involves decorating truck bodies, and a large part of the decorations are writing, both in arabic and in roman letters. Illiterate painters sub-contract this part of the work.

59. Although literacy is essential for individual empowerment, it is not easy to see how literacy training, even functional literacy,[8] can be introduced when the working hours of apprentices are long and hard. It would be surprising, though, if in some cases and in some trades functional literacy training could not be introduced: casual observation revealed a desire on the part of some trainees to write and read. Painting, for example, seems to be an obvious case for literacy to form an integral part of the training, just as theory is for radio and mechanics. It is suggested that ASYAR include this issue in its policy review.

60. **Costs**. It is difficult to undertake a meaningful or even indicative cost analysis of ASYAR which would provide useful unit cost figures, without a more extensive exercise that was permitted during the time of this study. This is because at any given period courses of different lengths are starting and stopping, making it difficult to arrive at a full unit cost per completer. Direct costs are easily ascribed as

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6. A comprehensive and thorough survey of employment, income and skills among Afghan refugees was undertaken by UNRISD in late 1985 (title page lost). It reported that 50 per cent of the sample wished to have training in driving, tailoring, mechanics, carpentry, masonry and carpet weaving. In all 24 types of training were asked for. 70 per cent of the sample was composed of farmers and 1 in 6 had occupational skills. In the 18-49 age group only 31 per cent claimed literacy, only 3 per cent of females. 10 per cent had completed secondary education.

7. Of all trades visited by the mission the tailor was the only one who did not want his son to come into his business.

8. Literacy which is closely related to immediate environment.

they are derived from the stipend and the value of tools, but the allocation of overhead costs to each completer is complex with the variable training lengths.

61. ASYAR has the highest single budget of any programme, 476,000 ECU for the current year. Just over 40 per cent of these costs are for toolkits and apprentice grants: these costs are functionally related to the number of apprenticeships and therefore not subject to economies of scale. Local staff salaries are only 14 per cent of the total (compared to 25 per cent for PMT), and although the staff-trainee ratio may have possibilities of reduction, cost savings would be minimal.

62. Thus the key issue in looking at programme costs and cost efficiency is the length of training and the trainee grants. Increased numbers of trainees with the same budget would appear to be one way to effect at least a partial improvement in internal efficiency, though issues of external efficiency would need to be taken into consideration. However, unlike the other programmes there would not necessarily be significant reductions in average costs of trainees were numbers of trainees to be increased.

Conclusions

63. In general terms the mission is impressed with the programme concept and with its external efficiency. Further management information development would enable a better understanding of internal efficiency issues, but it is not felt that the programme is inefficient. As with the other programmes in ITC more concentration on policy development and related planning would yield benefits to programme managers and to Afghan apprentices. Suggestions for some of the contents for policy and planning review are suggested above, and of these issues training length, monitoring and access of women to training are considered important.

3.2.2 SOS-PG/SAB – Teacher Training

64. **Background**. Primary schooling for Afghan refugees is organised through two main sources, the Education Cell of the UNHCR under the Committee for Afghan Refugees (CAR) (staffed by Pakistanis, created in 1981), and the seven Afghan political parties in exile. A number of bilateral agencies assist in this area, most particularly the Germans through GTZ and to a smaller extent the Americans under the International Rescue Committee (IRC), supported by UNHCR with EC funding. The GOP is also involved through the Directorate for Technical Education (DTE). Until about three years ago there was negligible concern with the training and professional support of teachers, and in general it is fair to say that there has been an inadequate overall approach to the provision of schooling in regard to its educational planning implications. This is in part to be expected because of the transitory nature of the problem, but at the same time it remains true that once formal schooling begins to be provided a rational framework should be developed to support it. As the duration of the refugee problem has become extended more efforts have been made to strengthen education provision.

65. **Enrolments**. Children between the ages of 5 and 17 make up between 40 and 50 per cent of the refugee population.[9] In 1989 there were over 111,000 enrolments in the twelve grades of primary and secondary education at CAR schools, of which 106,000, or some 95 per cent, were at the primary level (Grades 1-6). In the same period total refugee registrations numbered over 2.2 million, of which about 1.1 million were children aged between 7 and 17. Thus about 10 per cent of children were enrolled.[10] The number of girls was not known, but it appears that about 20 per cent of schools are girls' schools. It is

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9. UNRISD 1987 survey (Hanne Christensen and Wolf Scott).

10. See Education and Training for Afghan Refugee Children in NWFP and the UNHCR Programme, L A Stahl, UNHCR, Peshawar, 1990.

clear that girls are not being sent to school in large numbers. Completion rates are low. Between 10 and 15 per cent of those who started primary school complete Grade 6, though about 20-25 per cent complete Grade 5: most schools do not have a grade 6. There were over 3,000 teachers with an average pupil-teacher ratio of about 35:1. A small study undertaken by SOS-PG in 1990 showed significant repetition rates through 5 grades in sample schools averaging about 35 per cent with highest repetition at 4th grade of over three in every five children.

66. **Curriculum**. The curriculum of the primary schools is dominated by religion and language. In Grades 2-4, for example, out of 42 periods per week 16 (38 per cent) are devoted to religious subjects and 12 (28 per cent) to languages. The curriculum is currently under review and it is envisaged that science and social studies will be reinforced. Textbooks are available and appear to be widespread in schools.

67. The goal of SOS-PG is to organise primary school teacher-training to Afghan teachers. The training to be provided should as far as possible reflect accepted good practice, and should take into account the particular needs of girls. The SOS/PG teacher training initiative is one of only a small number of institutional initiatives in this area, the other main ones being through the Pak-German Project and the UNHCR Education Cell. The scope of the latter is small, while the former is at the moment focusing on Grades 1 and 2, working in about 500 schools.

68. SOS/PG's programme has two teacher training thrusts in this component. First, four 21/2 month full-time teacher training courses are given in the ITC, at the Teacher Training Centre (TTC). Second, a programme of school-based in-service training through the deployment of Pedagogic Mobile Teams (PMT's) is run out of ITC. The Education Department (as opposed to the apprenticeship training department) is divided into two sections to administer the two programmes. There is one expatriate administrator who shares his time with ASYAR: otherwise the programme is run by Afghans.

69. **Staff**. Total professional staff include five TTC teachers and ten PMT supervisors, including two women. There is an Afghan pedagogic director who is responsible for the execution of the programme, two administrative staff and three drivers. The staffing of this programme appears efficiently organised, but should PMT expand additional provision in the way of transport might be required.

TTC

70. About 40 teachers are recommended by the Education Cell of the UNHCR for participation in each course in the TTC in response to a letter from SOS/PG announcing the start of a new course. In the past the course lasted for 4 months but was reduced at the request of the CAR. ITC has no say in the selection of teachers, and they come from a widely dispersed range of locations. The trainees board at the ITC. They are given a small test on arrival and divided into two groups of about 20 each. SOS-PG has just completed the 17th TTC session.

71. The course is structured with 40 periods per week, 400 in total over the 21/2 months. 32 of these periods are devoted to academic subjects related to the primary school curriculum, covering Math, Languages, Science and Social Studies (although the primary curriculum is currently under review). Each trainee has one day's supervised teaching practice. The course does not take women teachers.

PMT

72. The second programme of teacher training and support is the PMT programme. The PMT staff of the Education Department undertake a survey of refugee schools twice a year to identify teachers in need of professional development. After each survey 40-50 teachers are selected in a cluster of schools, and these schools are then intensively visited over a period of about 45 working days. Where possible graduates of the TTC are included in the programme, though in fact it is likely that the greater part of

these graduates do not participate in PMT programmes because of their geographical dispersion. The school-based INSET covers about 160 teachers per year.

73. In addition to these school-based in-service sessions (called 'Follow-up Visits'), PMT staff provide afternoon training over a period of ten days twice a month to selected teachers in greatest need in a Resource Centre, covering about 40 teachers per year. They also run four or five seminars for teachers of 15 days each, covering some 160 teachers altogether. These programmes are held in Peshawar and in Bajaur, with a total coverage therefore of about 320 teachers.

Teacher Training Programmes – Discussion

74. The foregoing description is necessarily brief.[11] This section reviews the relative effectiveness of the two programmes, TTC and PMT, and presents suggestions for consideration which might strengthen the programme.

75. SAB is currently in the process of assessing the TTC programme, particularly in the light of the reduction of its length to 21/2 months. At the same time consideration is being given to the introduction of a 12 month residential teacher training course for teachers from inside Afghanistan.[12] The re-assessment of the TTC programme is timely, particularly in view of the undoubted impact of the PMT's. There seemed to be agreement among the trainers in ITC that the impact of the TTC courses was limited, not least because of the lack of subsequent support for graduates which is difficult to provide because of their dispersion throughout the province. In addition, a brief review of TTC reports and the syllabus prompted the reflection that the courses are academically oriented.

76. The future of the TTC approach, whether 21/2 or 12 months, must depend on an assessment by SAB of the relative value of concentrating their resources on the two types of programme, one based in ITC, the other an outreach programme. A further consideration relating to the twelve month programme is how the certification awarded will eventually be accepted in the Afghan system, but this is a relatively small issue. The PMT programme in the view of the mission has a strong impact. This is supported by a comparative study undertaken by PMT of schools which had benefited from the PMT and those which had not. Although the terms of reference of the comparison were limited, there was a significant improvement in attendance rates at the PMT schools. It is suggested that regular surveys and evaluations of this nature are incorporated into the PMT programme.

77. Costs. There was insufficient opportunity to undertake a detailed financial analysis of the programmes. However, the relative efficiency of the two types of programme is reflected in the numbers of trainees supported through each programme in relation to the costs of the programme. Taking budgeted costs for the current period, the TTC and PMT budgets are about the same at 186,000 ECU each.[13] There is an annual output from the TTC of 160 teachers, or 1,162 ECU per teacher, compared to an annual coverage of the same number, 160 teachers, in the six week PMT follow-up programmes, plus a further 360 teachers in the seminars: the PMT's touch about 520 teachers per year. The main justification for the higher cost TTC programme would be a proportionately higher level of quality of output, and this is not,

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11. A slightly more detailed description is included in an evaluation of the education programmes in Mission d'Evaluation de Project Education (TTC-PMT) de Solidarité Afghanistan au Pakistan à Peshawar, Nelly Muselli, May 1991. In general this mission is in agreement with the conclusions of this document, with important exceptions as described in the text.

12. The twelve month course proposal is contained in a memorandum to the board of SAB resulting from discussions between field staff and a Mujaheddin commander. Options also include PMT activity inside Afghanistan.

13. Assuming that half the costs of the expatriate administrator allocated to the Education Department are ascribed to each programme: in the budget they are included in the TTC head.

by general agreement, likely to be the case. For the same resources the PMT programme appears to have a greater coverage and a greater impact on quality.

78. **Education of Girls**. As always in considering Afghan refugee programmes the situation regarding women and girls is one which can cause concern. There is ample evidence that literacy and education among women has an impact on health and family planning as well as on the home environment for learning. While the SOS-PG programmes are not concerned with access to education and with school place provision, there is room for strengthening the PMT's impact on girls' education. It appears that in the refugee camp context there is considerable sensitivity about this subject, but at the same time it must be true that any NGO involved in education for refugees should include as a main goal access to women teachers and the improvement of the quality of girls' education. The education team in ITC are aware of this issue, and it is the opinion of the mission that there has been considerable effort to address it. There is room to increase the female staff and their impact on their selected schools.

79. **Staff Development**. Professional support to the field staff would be of the greatest benefit. This could consist of short study tours in Europe (or elsewhere, depending on financing sources), which should be well focused on such areas as headmaster training, learning resources and particular aspects of curriculum development and teaching methods such as math and science. Another approach would be to seek links with teacher training institutions which would result in the exchange of personnel, again in a focused way. Such links would also strengthen SAB's ability to support the teacher training programmes: it is understood that none of the board of SAB profess specialism in education and training. In that one aim of the NGO should be to support their Afghan staff in the introduction and dissemination of good educational practice in Afghanistan when the time comes, consideration should be given to staff development.

80. **Links with Other Programmes**. It is suggested below in the discussion of health training activities in ITC that PMT and MTA should together discuss issues of community health training for MTA students. This could involve MTA students working with PMT supervisors in schools to gain experience of child health and family health education and to include health in the in-service training of teachers.

81. **Evaluation**. The programme should place more emphasis on the evaluation of the quality effects of its interventions. These could include studies over time (before and after) and cross-section studies, comparing project schools with non-project schools. This would allow feedback into the programmes and stimulate a drive to greater relevance.

Conclusions

82. It is suggested that strong consideration be given to discontinuing the full-time courses for teachers teaching in Pakistan. The PMT programme is innovative and interesting, and should be strengthened and developed. The proposed programme for teachers from Afghanistan should be carefully reviewed and the question answered whether the resources of SOS-PG are best placed in such a programme, or could they be concentrated on increasing the coverage of the PMT's. Preference might be given to starting a PMT programme inside Afghanistan rather than taking badly needed teachers who would presumably be replaced by inexperienced teachers out of their schools for a year. In place of the TTC a Resource Centre might be established in ITC. In addition, current work on the training of principals could be expanded: there is ample evidence that headmaster training yields high returns in terms of quality and school performance. It would not be desirable for SOS-PG to become involved in secondary education for similar reasons.

83. SAB should also give strong consideration to the programme's goals in regard to the education of girls. A more systematic evaluation of the effects of PMT would be valuable. A third consideration is the need for the teacher training staff to receive exposure to developments in the the education field: this is particularly important in view of the undoubted future need in Afghanistan for a pool of teachers with sound ideas of good practice.

84. **The Future**. While there is need in the refugee camps for teacher support and development the SOS-PG programme is of great relevance and addresses a major need. The discussion of a cross-border programme is an indication of changing circumstances in the refugee situation. In an Afghanistan of the future under a national government teacher training will, of course, become a national responsibility. At the same time, however, as is demonstrated in many other countries, there is likely to be a role for an NGO involved in basic education.

3.2.3 MTA

85. This section describes the MTA programme. The next section describes MRCA, and both are thereafter discussed together because of their common aims and interests.

86. AMI runs a number of projects in Pakistan and Afghanistan, of which the Medical Training for Afghans (MTA) project is based in ITC. The goal of MTA is to train young Afghans to cope with 90 per cent of the medical cases with which they are presented in the field. Students receive 16 months' training based in ITC to the level of 'Advanced Mid-Level Health Workers'. About 25 are selected from 150-200 candidates, all male, proposed by political parties and commanders. The main criterion for selection is the motivation to return to Afghanistan to work in an isolated area without existing medical facilities.

87. An unusual feature of the MTA course is its links with a small teaching hospital in ITC, which is run by MRCA (Medical Refresher Course for Afghans). The trainees undergo practical training in surgery, anaesthesia and dentistry in simple but well-equipped facilities, including an operating theatre and a dental surgery. MTA expatriate staff currently include four doctors, three nurses and a medical coordinator – all volunteers – and an administrator is funded through SAB. Links also exist with other organisations in Peshawar, including Avicen, a French NGO funded also by the EC, which provides training in immunisation.

88. On graduation the trainees return to Afghanistan and are provided with equipment and drugs by their sponsoring organisations, which include Medical Science for Health (MSH), an American NGO, the Swedish and the Norwegian Committees. They return annually to Peshawar for re-supply and refresher courses. MTA undertakes continuous tracer studies. These show currently that of the 69 trainees who have passed their training, 46 are running clinics in Afghanistan, 1 is about to return, 1 is working in a refugee camp, 8 are working with NGO's, 1 is studying medicine in Peshawar University, and the rest are not accounted for: they may have been killed, be moving between areas or be otherwise engaged. Thus 83 per cent of graduates are undertaking the work for which they were trained.

3.2.4 MRCA

89. The Medical Refresher Course for Afghans (MRCA) was started in 1985 and taken over in 1988 by the French NGO Oeuvres Hospitalières Françaises de l'Ordre de Malte (OHFOM). The goal of the MRCA is the provision of short refresher courses to Afghans who have already received some training, or of basic training, according to need. Students are sent by sponsoring organisations, and are not selected by MRCA. In addition, MRCA provides facilities and staff for MTA training. MRCA medical teams also undertake operations and other curative activities mainly for refugees and war-wounded, and training is

8. **Management at NGO level in ITC**. The mission was impressed with the professional competence manifested by the projects. This competence would be greatly enhanced by (a) a reorientation of the use of expatriate personnel from daily administration towards technical and professional management and development; (b) clearer job descriptions and lines of accountability for all staff where these are lacking; (c) the introduction of improved accounting practices; (d) increased management information availability on which to base discussions on efficiency improvements and more relevant reporting; (e) certain organisation and methods improvements. The mission, in making these suggestions, was conscious of the need to respect the characters and cultures of the NGO's and that the introduction of any changes which would bring greater effectiveness to the programmes should be at a manageable pace.

9. **Management of Central Services in ITC**. The mission proposed approaches to rationalising and strengthening the management of the ITC complex. There are a number of different options, and the mission recommended that these be discussed and agreed by the NGO's themselves. The mission recognised the NGOs' wishes that their respective organisations should retain control over their technical operations, and that the final proposal for strengthening ITC central services would recognise this through clear statements of relative responsibilities.

10. **NGO-EC Interface**. The mission remarked that there was inadequate understanding on the part of both the NGO's and the EC of each others' policies, goals and practices, and three measures are proposed. First, it is recommended that a joint review of these issues form part of the policy review described above. It is also recommended that the EC prepare a manual to guide NGO's through EC procedures. Finally, a system of reporting and payment is recommended that will minimise the cash-flow burdens on the NGO's which result from the administration time taken in processing disbursements to NGO's by the EC. It is recommended that, on the basis of cash flow forecasts based on detailed work plans prepared by the NGO's, the EC disburses tranches equivalent to nine months' planned expenditure, justified every six months in the normal six monthly financial reports.

Reporting, Monitoring and Evaluation

11. The mission made specific proposals to improve financial reporting (Chapter 4) and management reporting, based on improved evaluation procedures (Chapter 5).

Conclusion

12. The mission has expressed a very positive approach to the work of the NGO's and supports the model of EC-NGO relations of which the ITC is a prototype. With the suggestions made in this report, all of which are relatively simple to implement, a project of considerable external and enhanced internal efficiency will emerge, much to the benefit of the refugees at which it is directed.

13. The mission did not feel it appropriate to make strong recommendations which would place undue burdens on the NGO's. However, it was felt that the need for improvements in management, including financial management and rationalised accounting procedures, are important and steps should be taken as soon as possible to set these in motion. If in-house skills in these areas are not available (the mission believes that the NGO's should as far as possible seek assistance from internal sources), the mission recommended that EC assist with a consultant.

based on these activities. Over the period January 1990 to May 1991 some 40 trainees have passed through MRCA courses, not including the 20 MTA students.

90. MRCA's curative activities vary in volume. Over the period November 1989 to March 1991 they averaged each month as follows:

–	Surgical activities	52
–	Anaesthesia	51
–	X-Ray activities	245
–	Dental activities	363
–	Dressing (nr of occupied beds)	33

91. As a point of comparison, the average monthly activity for one team of ICRC surgeons in Peshawar is about 300, six times the level of the MRCA team. The difference is partly, but probably not entirely, accounted for by the surgical team's engagement in training and consultations, as well as by longer ICRC hours.

92. Thus, although the main goal of MRCA is training, there is significant curative activity. Expatriate staff include a surgeon, an anaesthetist, an X-Ray technician and a nurse. They are complemented by an Afghan surgeon and dentist and 12 ancillary paramedical staff. Facilities in ITC include 2 operating theatres, a pharmacy, an X-Ray room, a dental clinic and 40 beds. Of all the organisations in ITC MRCA proposes the most diversified funding, with some 40 per cent of its budget derived from non-EC sources.

Discussion of MTA and MRCA

93. These programmes were the subject of an EC evaluation two years ago.[14] For the purpose of this discussion MTA and MRCA are treated together as many of the issues are common to both. They are, however, two separate programmes with similar, but not identical goals, and their common treatment here should not be taken as lack of recognition of their distinctive characters.

94. Both programmes must be considered in the context of the war in Afghanistan, and the likely developments over the next few years. The main issue relates to their emphasis on training in curative medicine and the relation of this type of training to the needs of an Afghanistan at peace. Considerable work is under way at present in the WHO health worker standardisation programme to rationalise health worker certification and competencies. The outcome of the negotiations is not yet known, but MTA and to some extent MRCA will need to adapt their training, if this is appropriate and necessary, to fit into the agreed system.

95. **Primary Health Care in Afghanistan**. There is no suggestion that MTA and MRCA propound what has been termed the 'Asclepian Cult' as their programmes have arisen as a direct response to war and war-related injury and disease. Indeed, throughout the developing world charitable expenditure on health has tended to be characterised by a focus on specific sectors. However, the importance of giving attention to the current and future health and well-being of communities as a whole rather than restricting attention to sickness and care of individuals is increasingly accepted in the literature.[15] This type of sentiment is intended to serve as a caution against the often-encountered implicit notion that health is something determined by the delivery of health services rather than by overall development. Community health workers and paramedics need to have a wider social outlook.

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14. Dr Kindermans' report, March 1989.

15. See, for example, an excellent recent review, *Health and Health Care in the Third World*, D R Phillips, Longman, 1990.

96. In Afghanistan not only are the numbers of health workers rising annually, but also the directly war-related nature of their work is likely to be reduced. This may affect the type of training given, and emphasises again the need for constant in-house evaluation of goals. If, for example, work inside Afghanistan becomes steadily more possible issues of health education become more important, including access to women. The MTA and MRCA courses are deliberately oriented to training to a high degree of medical competence, and are partly at least hospital oriented. There may well develop a case for greater emphasis on training on the health environment, taking a wider view of health issues and gaining access to the family.

97. Five principles inform the basic components of a Public Health Care (PHC) service:

- education about diseases, health problems and their control;
- safe water and basic sanitation;
- Maternal and Child Health (MCH) and Family Planning (FP);
- immunisation againts major infectious diseases;
- appropriate treatment of common diseases and injuries;
- provision of essential drugs.

98. **Health Education and the Health Environment**. The MTA programme addresses the last three of these principles but has placed less emphasis on the first three. In terms of the structure of the post-war Afghan health system it is hoped that the current (and derived from necessity) vertical approach will move towards a more integrated and horizontal approach. Such an approach is, conceptually at least, based on views of the epidemiologic transition (analagous to the demographic transition) which includes, among other characteristics, recognition that the most profound changes in health and disease patterns occur among young children and women.[16] This indicates the need for access to women and to children. Access to women appears to cause certain problems in the current Afghan situation, though how deep-rooted this problem may be appears to be a matter of discussion, while access to children can be achieved through primary schools. There is growing experience in this area (the Child-to-Child programmes in several countries; the Indonesian *Doktor Kecil* ('little doctor') programme).

99. **Trainees' Aspirations**. In order better to understand how MTA trainees will fit into a future Afghanistan health system MTA and MRCA could elaborate their tracer mechanisms through which they keep track of graduates. They could survey attitudes of trainees: how do they view themselves in a future health system? Do they want to become doctors, or are they genuinely willing to continue as relatively high level community health workers in rural areas? If it were found that trainees' aspirations were dominated by the future incentive to become fully trained doctors a reappraisal of the programmes would be indicated. This is because a key policy is to select trainees with motivation to work in isolated areas.

100. On the basis of the foregoing brief discussion two thoughts present themselves. First, in order to prepare its Health Workers for such a system it may be appropriate for MTA to consider a change in orientation in some of its course. MRCA could consider including appropriate material in its refresher courses, or, indeed, prepare a specialised course. Second, MTA and MRCA have built up deep knowledge of the Afghan health situation. They are in a position to influence future directions of policy as currently under discussion in the WHO, UNHCR and other groups. The underlying goal of MTA to train students to deal with 90 per cent of cases implies a viable system for referrals, and also a health system which is not hierarchically based on urban hospitals but in which referrals could be between equal levels. This type of thinking is to a large extent within WHO policy, but the sort of training and subsequent support

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16. See A R Omran, The Epidemiologic Transition: a theory of the epidemiology of population change, *Millbank Memorial Quarterly* 49(4), 1971; and Phillips *op.cit.* p.42.

provided by MTA and MRCA could well contribute to the establishment of a non-urban biased referral network in Afghanistan at a relatively high (but below trained doctor) level. In the view of the mission, technically oriented systems with upward referral are seldom appropriate in developing countries.

101. Links with Other NGO's. Related to this second point is the need for optimising the spatial distribution of health delivery. This is a particular problem where health systems have grown up in a haphazard manner, as in Afghanistan. MTA has selected trainees partly according to health needs in particular under favoured districts. Proper future planning of full health services in these districts will be required, and MTA's knowledge and experience could support this planning. One approach could be to liaise with other NGO's involved in lower level CHW training. Development of health education could involve linking with SOS-PG's PMT programme to give MTA and MRCA (where appropriate) trainees experience of going to primary schools and dealing with primary children and teachers.

102. Benefits. It is useful to define the benefits of MTA and MRCA training before considering their costs in more detail. These benefits may be categorised as follows:[17]

(a) Patients treated and cured by graduates;
(b) Training and consequent multiplier effects provided by graduates;
(c) Patients treated and cured in ITC.

103. If MTA training achieves its goal of enabling trainees to handle 90 per cent of local cases (either through treatment or referral), then the ratio of benefits to cost is conceptually higher than were graduates able to handle only 60 per cent.[18] The benefits are not restricted to personal cure benefits. They are also reflected in enhanced economic activity and self sufficiency of cured individuals. Similarly, each MTA graduate trains assistants in his clinic and these in turn multiply the benefits. Each graduate treats about 750 patients per month, and, assuming the 90 per cent rate, 675 are successfully dealt with. Over a period of 16 months, the length of one years' training, nearly 11,000 patients are successfully treated by one MTA graduate. MTA also makes about 600-700 out-patient consultations per month, and hospitalises a small number. Over a 16 month period this totals on average to about 10,500 patient consultations, or 525 per completing trainee (10,500/20).[19]

104. It is also of interest to compare benefits and costs of the different ITC programmes. Such a comparison is virtually impossible, but it highlights relative costs and focuses thoughts on priorities and goals. For example, the ASYAR programme has the highest single budget of any of the NGO's, and its benefits are identified in the context of income generation. The medical budgets are, taken separately, lower, and their benefits are concerned with human health and life. The open ended question to ask (and perhaps impossible to answer) is 'Which is a priority, income generation for poor people or health improvements, given limited resources?' The opportunity cost of the one is expressed in terms of the other....

105. Costs. The costs of such programmes can only be judged in relation to the benefits which accrue from it. The following paragraphs speculate on cost issues, but in terms of economic analysis rather than management accounting. The purpose of these speculations is to set questions of absolute cost in the context of benefits, and to suggest that while management accounting tools are important to enable

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17. It will be noted that these are not the same as rates of return to individual training: they are rather social returns to project investment.

18. Though this is excessively simple: the marginal cost of training for the 30 per cent might exceed the marginal benefits.

19. Of course, many of these patients might in fact be the same person.

managers to judge their efficiency, the absence of norms renders it difficult to make judgements on absolute cost.

106. In regard to costs the general point must be made that programmes such as these which have as explicit goals a relatively high level of medical competence are likely to cost more than programmes with lower level training competency goals. There are thus two separate questions to answer: (a) is the absolute level of training relevant to the Afghan situation; and (b) can the unit costs of the programme be lowered without reduction in the quality of output?

107. Analysis of the MTA programme is complicated by its intrinsic links with MRCA and the use of MRCA facilities. In a sense the reciprocal is not the case in that MRCA does not depend on MTA for facilities or staff (with minor exceptions). However, in that up to 50 per cent of MRCA training capacity is reported to be taken up with training MTA students, any reduction in MTA students would indicate the need for a substantial increase in MRCA's own intake. It should also be borne in mind that although capital costs may be 'high', recurrent operating costs of graduates appear to be low: the programme is not, as is often the case with full medical doctor training, creating high cost systems through its training.

108. It was generally agreed by all those to whom the mission spoke outside the project that the quality of MTA and MRCA graduates is high, and their performance good. It also appeared to be widely accepted, including MTA and MRCA staff themselves, that it was necessary to keep the question of relevance under continuous review. A recent thesis undertook an interesting evaluation of selected MTA graduates as well as the course itself,[20] and made realistic, though not necessarily representative conclusions, some of which are reflected in this report. In particular, it recommends attention to local conditions in the changing Afghan scene.[21]

109. The 1989 EC evaluation of MTA, which confirmed the quality of its programme, recommended (p.32) the increase in the number of students to 25. This has been achieved.[22] The current number of trainees is 20, 6 having dropped out after examinations. At the same time MTA staff undertake consultations which include training consultations, and MTA maintains 20 beds in the hospital. In effect the total budget of MTA is divided between direct training costs and indirect training costs, which are all costs involved in maintaining the hospital and out-patient consultation facilities.

110. **Justification for Teaching Hospital Student Costs**. The reason why these costs should be considered as indirect training costs rather than patient cure costs lies in the fact that the primary goals of MTA and MRCA are to train, and curative activities are ancillary or directly concerned with training. The justification for this approach lies in the need for this type of training to have a strong practical component, and experience is an expensive commodity.[23] All training with heavy practical content bears higher unit costs than other training, and this is one of the reasons for the need for constant concern about external efficiency.

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20. De Peshawar à la Vallée du Panchir, Formation et Evaluation d'Agents de Santé Afghans, D Raimond, Université de Nancy I, 1991 (Thesis for Doctor of Medicine).

21. For example (p.201), "..il ne nous paraît pas aberrant d'adapter l'enseignement en fonction des régions d'origine des étudiants: selon les structures sanitaires, le réseau routier et la population en place, l'étudiant pourrait ne pas bénéficier d'une formation assez 'poussée' en chirugie et, en revanche, suivre d'avantage de cours relevant de la santé publique". The thesis also describes the difficulties the trainees face in the field.

22. It also recommended engagement of Afghan personnel, which has also been accomplished.

23. "Experience is a good teacher, but she sends in terrific bills." (Minna Antrim).

111. Average Costs. The total budget for MTA over a 16 month training cycle is about 440,000 ECU. This averages about 22,000 ECU per graduate, ascribing all costs to training and none to curative activities. Were 25 students to complete instead of 20, the unit cost is reduced to 17,600 ECU, and 30 would yield a unit cost of 14,600 ECU. In other words, the programme should review its capacity to take more students without increasing fixed costs (staff, equipment, etc).

112. However, as has been noted, it is not possible to analyse MTA costs without considering MRCA costs. If MRCA facilities were not present MTA would look to other hospitals, and costs of these hospitals would need to be ascribed to the programme.[24] MRCA over a 16 month period produces about 40 completed trainees, though these are all on short courses of 3 weeks to 5 months. Total student months are lower (about 100 as contrasted with 300 for MTA), but curative activities are higher. Between them, MRCA and MTA graduate about 60 trainees over a 16 month period. Their combined budgets for this period total about 820,000 ECU, or about 13,600 ECU per completer. It can be seen that were both organisations able to increase their training intakes and outputs – and both agree that this is possible physically – these costs would fall. The effect of grouping MRCA and MTA is to reduce average costs per trainee, although under the somewhat artificial assumption of homogeneity of output.

Conclusions

113. Closer examination of management information, *not with a view to presenting what may appear to be favourable figures but rather as an aid to internal programme analysis*, would enable MTA and MRCA programme managers to make better informed judgements on management issues. The organisations' constant evaluation of and reflection on issues relating to its medical programmes is impressive: the overall approach to management information as a tool of programme analysis may be improved. In particular, the relation between costs, capacity and training enrolments should be under constant review.[25]

114. Number of Trainees. The main issue in relation to average costs is whether the number of trainees can be increased, and at the same time, of course, it is necessary to decide whether numbers *should* be increased: this depends on a view of the need for the product. MRCA is very flexible in that it runs different types of course according to need. MTA up to the present offers one basic type of training, with short refresher courses for graduates (not included in the above calculations) as appropriate. Its options therefore include, of course, the introduction of other types of programme.

115. Relevance and Orientation of Training. It appeared to be generally agreed that the changing circumstance in Afghanistan will require partial re-orientation of health worker training goals. The precise nature of these changes is difficult to gauge, and to some extent will be influenced by the conclusions of the WHO standardisation programme. One important area for consideration is health education and access to women and children as part of an increasing emphasis on the overall health environment: it is suggested that MTA could benefit from linking with PMT to provide experience for trainees in primary schools. Other links could be made with NGO's working at a 'lower' level[26] in order to develop horizontal structures in the selected areas. Another are for consideration may be reduced emphasis on surgical training, which at the moment does not appear to have priority in any case.

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24. They would not, however, need to be supported by donors to MTA but rather by other sources of funding. However, the possibility exists that MTA would have to make a financial contribution to other training hospitals for its students.

25. This process could form part of policy reviews suggested in and also as part of system developments proposed in Chapter 4.

26. Though the concept of 'lower' only applies in a vertical pyramidal structure of health systems: here it refers to complexity and length of training.

116. **The Future**. Both AMI and MRCA have as a general aim the transfer of their activities into Afghanistan when appropriate. Their current training work is almost entirely concerned with medical workers who are stationed in Afghanistan. The length of the MTA training course indicates the need for an 18 month perspective at least, MRCA has more flexibility. The main issue therefore relates to their perceptions of the role of their graduates after their training. In that much of both programmes' professional success has lain in their relation with Afghan commanders and parties as well as with other foreign organisations involved in the health training area, answers to this question are not entirely in their control. If they judge that the demand for their training is continuing and valid, then it will no doubt continue.

3.2.5 SANDY GALL'S AFGHANISTAN APPEAL (SGAA)

117. SGAA started in 1986 and in 1989 moved to ITC. It has not yet received EC funding and does not submit progress reports to EC. The organisation has two parallel goals. It does not, unlike the other health training organisations in ITC, limit its goal to training, and regards treatment activities as an adjunct to the training on the teaching hospital model, giving equal value to the treatment of the disabled. Its special fields are physiotherapy and the fabrication of orthopaedic appliances.

118. The need for curative as well as training activities in this area is, as with other medical programmes, clear. The war in Afghanistan, of which a particular feature is extensive mining with mines designed to maim, not to kill, has resulted in a significant proportion of the population, a large number being children, suffering from physical disabilities, either directly, or indirectly from diseases such as poliomyelitis and tuberculosis, the spread of which is assisted by civil disorder and a breakdown of health systems.

119. SGAA runs an orthopaedic workshop in ITC which produces prosthetic and orthotic appliances. There is also a physiotherapy clinic, and SGAA provides out-patient physiotherapy in ITC as well as supervision of 16 technicians in 12 Basic Health Units in 12 refugee camps, and 8 technicians at the Pakistan Red Crescent Society (PRCS) Centre. The workshop produces about 100 appliances per month, roughly two thirds of which are orthoses and one third prostheses.

120. **Training**. SGAA provides two types of training. Orthopaedic technicians receive 18 months of training and physiotherapists 12 months. There are currently 10 orthopaedic technicians under training, and 6 physiotherapists funded entirely by SGAA and another 12 funded by PRCS. In May 1990 16 orthopaedic technicians were graduated, 9 of which are working in independent workshops funded by WHO and the other 7 of which are working in ITC itself. A total of 9 physiotherapists have completed the twelve month course, 6 of whom are supervising work in the PRCS Centre. SGAA has also provided 4 month Community Based Rehabilitation Physiotherapy courses which 16 trainees have completed.

121. **Staff**. SGAA employs (though not all posts are filled at the time of writing) 5 expatriates, including 2 prosthetists/orthotists, 2 physiotherapists, and an administrator, and 41 local staff, including 25 workshop technicians, 9 physiotherapy technicians and 7 administrative support staff. The trainees are considered as employees: of the 25 workshop technicians 12 are trainees, and of the physiotherapy technicians 6 are students. Half the physiotherapy trainees are Pakistani.

122. SGAA has a policy of moving to Afghanistan at the appropriate time. As in the case of the other organisations in ITC SGAA is realistic about the prospects of such a move in the very near future, and does not expect sudden changes in its location.

Discussion of SGAA

123. SGAA is in many ways, as is evident from the foregoing brief description, somewhat different from its colleague organisations in ITC. This is partly because of its production operation, and partly because its use of relatively well-paid expatriates distinguishes it from essentially volunteer organisations (although other ITC based expatriates employed by SAB receive higher-than-volunteer remuneration). This practice is justified on the grounds that skilled volunteers are unavailable. Although, as is the case with all the medical NGO's in ITC, the mission was not qualified to evaluate the technical operations of SGAA,[27] a number of points arose from discussions, all of which are under review within SGAA.

124. Costs of Orthopaedic Appliances. SGAA is currently seeking ways in which to reduce the cost of fabricating appliances. These have been evaluated (Kaphingst report) as 'quality devices which come close to the world standard', which are made from local materials while giving priority to durability, involving a level of imported inputs. There is clearly therefore an important balance of choice of technology between imported and local material based processes which SGAA is currently re-evaluating.

125. Organisation of Production. Certain weaknesses, which perhaps spring from the need for more focused technical support from the head office (a problem shared with other organisations in ITC), can be identified in the organisation and management of the production process. This also relates to the training function, discussed below. There does not appear to be an adequate management information system which enables SGAA management to assess the efficiency of its production operations. This indicates at least the need to introduce a system of job cards, linked to patient cards with a unique patient number, in turn linked to time estimates for each job. The introduction of such a system would need to be supported by a clearer accountability of staff for each phase of the production process.

126. For example, were an individual to be made responsible for patient intake and another for final fitting and discharge, their responsibilities could be linked through a system of job cards and estimates of the length of time for treatment and appliance fabrication. A simple spreadsheet or dBase computerised record system based on unique patient numbers could easily generate the appropriate management and production information which could be discussed at weekly meetings. Accountability and responsibility for timeliness and quality of production would be clearly allocated. SGAA would benefit greatly from a simple organisation and methods analysis which would provide information on staff utilisation and possibilities of increasing output.

127. One effect of this system would be to reduce the number of uncollected appliances, currently about 40, which represent an inefficient use of resources. Often patients do not turn up for appointments, and come at times which are not convenient. There can be long delays in fitting, which clearly the organisation would like to reduce.

128. Similarly, the most significant constraint on production is reported to be delays in arrivals of imported components. Part of the delay is the six weeks required for approval of tax exemption. An improved stock balancing system would greatly relieve this bottleneck, and this should be fairly simply achieved in view of the fact that there are only about 30 major components. Weekly print-outs of stock items would be reviewed in the weekly meetings, and the spreadsheet could be programmed to flag individual components which fall below pre-determined quantities. In view of clearance delays 8 weeks supply of imported items appears to be the minimum level of stock required.

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27. An evaluation is to be found in Recommendations for Services for Orthopaedic Appliances in Afghanistan, W Kaphingst, WHO Geneva, December 1989. SGAA have also undertaken a number of internal studies.

129. Literacy. It is reported that some trainees have a relatively low level of education. Consideration might be given to including in their training basic literacy, numeracy and other higher level learning activities as appropriate.

130. Training Contents and Management. Greater formalisation could also be introduced to the training process. It appears that the exigencies of the production of appliances often result in training requirements being overlooked due to pressure of work. An example of this is to be found in the leather department where leather work is given to the shoe man who is much quicker that a trainee might be.

131. The training syllabuses[28] could be examined for possibilities of rationalisation, though this was an area not discussed in detail by the mission. Consideration should be given to defining the sets of competencies which trainees are expected to achieve by given stages of their training. The achievement of these competencies would be evaluated at prescribed times and records kept of performance. Other indicators of trainee competence and performance could be collected on the basis of work completed, attitudes and inter-personal skills (relations with patients, for example). Results of these trainee evaluations could be fed back into the training schemes.

132. It was understood that there is little induction for expatriate trainers. As part of the process of formalising the training process consideration should be given to providing induction courses in training for expatriates in order that they might better understand the process issues as well as the technical issues.

133. Length of Training. The *Guidelines* (op.cit.) recommend (Annex F) a full-time structured training course duration of 18 months but a 4 year course for on-the-job training. The theoretical instruction (Annex B) appears at first sight to be of a high order of complexity for relatively uneducated trainees (aimed at the British 'O' level or equivalent intake), leading to the conclusion that the SGAA course is adapted to local circumstances and does not aim at international academic standards. There may be some scope therefore to review the length of the training. Other options include more specialised training in limited techniques (WHO p.6). The mission was in no position to make judgements on these technical issues, but felt that useful discussions could be initiated within the SGAA organisation which might demonstrate that all the technical options had been fully explored. Again, these remarks are not directed at the technical operations of SGAA but rather at the issue of increasing the number of trainees without raising fixed costs.

134. Costs. The training of orthopaedic technicians as it is undertaken by SGAA in ITC requires by nature low instructor-trainee ratios: possibilities of increasing the number of trainees is limited. The high costs per trainee for SGAA are the result of the high cost of expatriate technicians. SGAA's total annual budget runs currently at 424,000 ECU, with about half of of this total allocated to expatriate staff costs. Over a training cycle of 18 months the budget pro-rates to about 636,000 ECU. If, in addition to the 10 Orthopaedic technicians trained during this period a total of 9 full time equivalent (fte) physiotherapists is added, to which then should be added a further 15 fte physiotherapists from PRCS, average costs per completer amount to about 18,000 ECU.

135. This type of crude calculation, like those made above for MTA/MRCA, hides differences in cost within the average and assumes an unrealistic homogeneity of output, but it gives a general order of unit magnitude. Were expatriate costs to be reduced more people could be trained and treated for less cost: a halving of expatriate costs would yield an average cost per completer of about 14,000 ECU, a reduction

28. Documents such as *Guidelines for training personnel in developing countries for prosthetic and orthotic services*, WHO, 1990, provide useful frameworks for systematic development.

of over 20 per cent. It must be an objective for SGAA to reduce over time its reliance on expensive expatriates. This could involve, *inter alia,*

(a) the training of Afghans to hold senior training positions, thereby increasing the ratio of low-cost to high-cost personnel;

(b) reducing the training period through greater efficiency of training delivery;

(c) increasing the number of trainees.

Conclusions

136. SGAA has an acknowledged high quality of fabricated appliances and has achieved an impressive professionalism in quality of production, as is confirmed by the WHO evaluation. The level of professionalism could without doubt be further enhanced by the introduction of simple management improvements. At the same time more attention could usefully be given to formalising the training process. The mission regarded as important the introduction of general management and training management improvements and SGAA appeared to share this view. This, combined with current research into reducing material costs would result in an increasing professionalisation of the organisation which would enable it to achieve its goals more efficiently. As with the other NGO's in ITC it is suggested that a far-reaching policy review would provide an appropriate structure for SGAA to address this wide range of issues.

CHAPTER 4

POLICY, PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT

4.1 Introduction

137. This chapter considers the entire range of institutional management and administration, including institutional policy generation, planning the implementation of policy, management and financial management, and other micro-management issues as appropriate. A key issue is the administrative and reporting arrangements between the EC and the NGO's, and this is largely concerned with finance and accounting systems. At the same time it is of the greatest importance that these issues, which are essentially fairly simple though technical, do not cloud the thinking of the organisations about the progress of their projects and how what they are doing relates to the future. Once again, the mission wishes to stress its sensitivity to the needs of NGO's and their organisational and personal motivations. The aim of this chapter is to raise issues for consideration by the NGO's in the hope that they will concur with the mission's view that strengthening policy making, management, management information, financial and reporting systems will aid them better to analyse their own effectiveness in achieving their goals and reduce the time they need to spend on administrative matters.

4.2 Policy Making, Planning and Management

Policy

138. Each NGO should as an individual organisation be in a position to state, within the context of a clear policy backed by defined objectives, quantitative and qualitative targets on a periodic basis. Targets are the short-term, immediate steps to achieving the general goals, as well as the basis for evaluation of progress. If a policy states that vulnerable groups, defined in a particular way, are to be principal beneficiaries of action, then a major component in evaluation is whether this policy is actually being followed. All the NGO's currently set out policies in their documentation, though they are not always explicit. There are varying degrees of detail between them. This section is not aimed at attempting to give direction to the organisations' policies: rather a structure of policy and planning is suggested.

139. Policy states the broad goals of an organisation through general statements on how these goals might be achieved. The purpose of these statements is to indicate an organisational 'philosophy' which can be interpreted in implementation plans and ultimately evaluated. These policies, and the implementation targets derived from them, were discussed in Chapter 3. It was noted, for example, that although vulnerable groups, defined as widows, orphans and the disabled, are intended as key beneficiaries of some training programmes, the activities of the programmes do not reflect success in achieving this goal. Senior management should thus address this issue.

140. **Policy Reviews**. It is important therefore that the headquarters of the NGO's continually monitor their success or failure in achieving their *general* goals, as well as their particular targets. The changing situation demands that in some cases a redefinition of policies is considered. Also, in view of the high turnover in expatriate staff a policy paper for each organisation would be invaluable for new recruits as part of their induction, as well as in order to bring all staff into the process of policy generation.

141. The NGO's situated in the Hyatabad complex may find it helpful to set out clearly their separate and joint policies in regard to their presence in the building and what they hope to gain from it. On the

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

1.1 TOR and Mission Objectives

1. This report is written in accordance with Terms of Reference to evaluate Project NA/AR/18/89 Vocational Training for Afghan Refugees in Pakistan, which are included in full in Annex A.[1] The project is in reality a variety of activities in the health, education and vocational training fields managed out of the Integrated Training Centre (ITC) in Hyatabad, a new development area to the north of Peshawar in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan and situated adjacent to one of the main refugee camps. The activities are linked by a common goal of training Afghans either for their return to Afghanistan to fulfil certain predisposed functions or to improve the situation in the refugee population. These goals are further defined in the report, but it is sufficient to note that the training activities are not restricted to refugees alone. For the purpose of this evaluation exercise the activities of the Non-Government Organisations (NGO's) as they take place either within, or based from, the ITC, are treated as one project in so far as they have a common interest in the Centre's strengthening and development, and as separate projects in so far as their professional and technical activities are the subject of discussion.

2. The broad thrust of the TOR is concerned with confirmation of the project's objectives and structure and its suitability for continuation of European Community (EC) financing after the current period. The evaluation covers all aspects of the programme, and pays particular attention to issues of general and financial management.

3. The mission is very grateful to the staff of the ITC who participated whole-heartedly in the exercise and who gave the team welcome hospitality; to the Coordinator of the EC's Refugee Programme for South Asia in Peshawar who participated closely in the activities of the mission, assisted in organising appointments, and to whom the team is grateful for a number of ideas which have been expanded in this report; and to the representatives of the agencies and individuals who kindly gave a good deal of their time to explain the wider situation as well as their views on the professional activities based in the ITC.

1.2 General Approach to the Evaluation and Structure of the Report

4. The evaluation exercise was conducted in a participatory manner and as far as was possible, given the time constraints, ideas and conclusions were discussed freely and openly with all the interested and affected parties. It is hoped that this report contains no surprises, and that there is general agreement with its conclusions. The team recognises that care must be taken in the introduction of change, and that the pace of any recommended changes should not be forced in order that all the NGO's may feel comfortable with them. There are, however, issues in the area of the management of the ITC which may require reasonably prompt attention. The team has endeavoured to understand as far as possible the professional goals of the organisations and individuals in ITC and to ensure that this evaluation, where it makes suggestions, will assist in achieving these goals more efficiently. The spirit of the NGO's and the

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[1] A mission of three specialists, Mr Piero Bellogini (finance and management), Mr Perran Penrose (economics, institutional aspects and training, and main author of the report) and Mr Ron Wootten (Vocational Training) visited Hyatabad from May 18th to May 31st 1991.

basis of these statements common interests may be identified and issues of autonomy clarified. It is apparent that a common purpose exists, but it has not been defined, with the result that the role of the central services is not fully understood.

142. It is proposed that each NGO prepare a review of policy which should include detailed statements of goals. In addition a joint policy review would be helpful in clarifying the relationship of each NGO to each other as well as to the Hyatabad complex and the EC: this could form the basis of decisions on the management of central services.

Planning

143. The need for planning has already been brought out in this report in the context of a joint exercise with the EC to develop a perspective plan so that each partner in this venture knows not only where its organisation is heading but also where the others are heading. Each programme has a different *planning cycle* which is a function of the duration of its principal activities. MTA has a course of 16 months, and its planning cycle will be over a period of 20 months or so, from the point of initiating discussions on the next course to course completion. ASYAR's planning cycle is more complex in that there are several training programme lengths at any one time: were these to be rationalised planning could become more effective. SGAA has two training cycles as well as a production planning cycle. MRCA, apart from its links with MTA, has a more reactive approach than the others in that trainees come as recommended. The teacher training cycles average about 4 to 5 months.

144. These planning cycles must be distinguished from periodic reporting phases and time-based (eg monthly) targets. Policy may be translated into the planning cycles, and the planning cycles divided into periodic phases for monitoring and reporting purposes. The main point is that all these phases should be *logical*, and not devised for the sake of report presentation. Plans do not have to be monthly, six monthly or other convenient divisions of a calendar year. They should be based squarely on the professional activities in the first instance and then divided as required.

145. The procedures outlined in the sections below on EC funding are designed to allow the NGO's to plan adequately as befits their needs. It is suggested therefore that when funding proposals are presented to the EC that they are based on plans defined around a logical professional cycle and only then presented in the required calendar year formats.

Management

146. Financial management is treated separately in the next sections, and links closely with this section, which is concerned with an outline of overall management strategy options. The permutations are numerous, and suggestions contained in this chapter must be taken as *indications of possible approaches* rather than concrete recommendations. The mission recognises the complex interaction of the NGO's in ITC and the need for the evolving relationships to continue on a course of evolution rather than revolution. The approaches defined here are therefore designed as stimuli for debate and consensus.

147. **Role of NGO Headquarters**. The first point to be made about the management of projects such as those under discussion is that they involve each NGO *as a whole*, including European headquarters as well as field offices. The need for head office support is crucial. Many of the human resources and skills required for successful implementation are not available in the field. Thus, although this and the following sections contain detailed suggestions on the strengthening of management and management information, coupled with a better definition of ITC central management responsibilities, it is the view of the mission that *each NGO is essentially responsible for its own management as well as professional development.* While consultants and others may be useful as resource people, each NGO should feel a sense of ownership of its management processes.

148. It has already been noted that headquarters support is stronger in some of the NGO's than in others. Again, as part of policy reviews, it might be useful for each NGO to consider in detail the nature of headquarters inputs into the projects, as well as the role of SAB as coordinating agency. Assistance in the development of clearer general management and production process systems in SGAA should be considered by SGAA UK; MTA/MRCA should combine to develop better management information systems; SAB should provide more detailed professional teacher training inputs to support and stimulate local staff; SAB could on its own find resources to improve local coordination systems on the lines proposed below; etc. In cases where the option exists the trustees/conseils de gestion of the NGO's might be strengthened with appropriate expertise which then becomes available 'in house' on a voluntary basis. All this could contribute to developing professional and management capacity while at the same time not impinging upon philosophy and organisational cultures.

149. **Relative Roles of Expatriates and Local Staff**. These reviews could result in a reappraisal of the role of expatriates in ITC. At present there are four programme managers sharing terms of reference in common which are essentially administrative. A number of managers thought that they were doing routine work which could be undertaken by others. It is suggested that consideration be given to a reorientation of expatriate management staff away from administration towards professional development. A further refinement might be better coordination of job descriptions so that specialist skills such as training management, finance, management information systems and general management could be shared among programme managers, rather than duplicated. Afghan/Pakistani administrators could take the burden of routine administration.

150. **Job Descriptions and Procedures**. Part of this process would be to review and improve written job descriptions, accountability and lines of responsibility. There appears to be some vagueness in job descriptions, and procedures are not always written. The need for greater clarity is indicated by the cooperative nature of ITC and a steady improvement of systems has been effected throughout the coordination office.

151. **ITC Central Management**. The mission participated in a good deal of discussion of the role of central services in relation to the felt need for professional autonomy by the NGO's. In such an evolving situation a good deal of thought and discussion is required before definitively resolving this issue, but most of the programme managers accepted the benefits that would accrue from a strengthened central support organisation. Many of the reservations were reservations of detail: some were reservations of principle, in particular relating to fears that in some way a strengthened central support organisation, combined with EC funding, could ultimately result in dilution of the NGOs' philosophies, policies and goals.

152. The process of debate on this issue must start with explicit and focused discussion of these policies as they relate to central management of the ITC. It is probably the case that, although it may be well understood that the purpose of a strengthened central management is to facilitate the NGO-EC interface and not to interfere in any way with NGO policies and goals, there would be a danger that unless the institutional relationships were clearly defined, some infringements or perceived infringements of NGO 'private' territory could occur. These matters can only be resolved through detailed negotiation. It was the view of the mission that in principle a stronger central support and management function was desirable in order to enable the NGO's to function efficiently within the EC funding framework and to benefit from external support, but the mission was not able, nor did it feel it appropriate to, prescribe in detail the role of such a central organisation.

153. **Organizational Change: from ITC Coordination to ITC Management**. The acceptance of the changes proposed in this report indicates the need for a more comprehensive and responsible managerial

function which, over and above the present responsibilities, should be invested with the necessary power required by the centralisation of common activities, in particular the coordination and preparation of the reports. For the sake of convenience this discussion will refer to a Programme Manager fulfilling this function, though the title of Coordinator could be continued. The essential distinction between management and coordination is the implication that management is more active and possesses a certain degree of line management power and responsibility.

154. The main difference between this proposed post and the present post of Coordinator would be the power of representation of all NGO's in financial matters connected with EC funding. Therefore the Programme Manager would be a Representative of all NGO's in the field, not only of Solidarité Afghanistan, with powers, to be agreed upon by the NGOs, equivalent to those of the leading NGO in respect of EC representation. The appointed person should be acceptable to all NGO's and need not necessarily come from the leading NGO.

155. The advantages which might accrue from the creation of such a post, which post should be limited to administrative and financial matters, thus leaving full freedom of action on matters related to the technical execution of the project and budget management to each NGO, include the following:

(a) better representation in the field;

(b) the possibility of local management of funds through a centralised EC account and transfers according to the needs expressed in the cash flow;

(c) timely presentation of reports and other information requested by the EC;

(d) assurance of uniformity through direct supervision and responsibility for the accounting system, formats and information;

(e) medium and long term savings and better employment of resources through centralisation of common services;

4.3 NGO-EC Interface

156. The developing relationship between the EC and the NGO's has been touched on throughout this report. The relationship manifests itself in Peshawar where there is regular contact between the EC Refugee Coordinator and the NGO's, and in Brussels where there are links with the NGO's through SAB and through the Peshawar office of the EC.

157. **Peshawar Office**. The role of the Peshawar office is necessarily limited by the fact of its small staffing: the Coordinator is assisted by one Afghan assistant. The mission held a number of discussions on the relationship between the EC office in Peshawar and the ITC NGO's, and there is general agreement that a supportive relationship has developed. Regular meetings are held to review progress, and these are discussed in Chapter 5, with some suggestions on how the EC Coordinator might strengthen the relationship. The office also verifies reports. Suggestions given in this report which concern clarification of EC policy and practice towards the NGO's will also be of great benefit to the Coordinating Office.

158. **Brussels**. The mission viewed it as important that EC policy and procedures towards the project are clarified. This will clearly involve maintaining a clear and single point of contact in Brussels for all matters, financial and professional, relating to the ITC. Such a rationalisation aids the Refugee Coordinator in Peshawar and develop the relations between EC Brussels and EC Peshawar in respect of this project.

159. **EC Manual for NGO's.** The NGOs' knowledge of EC procedures is incomplete, with the result that there has been a certain amount of misunderstanding, incomplete and/or wrong information as well as frequent changes in the presentation formats. It is therefore suggested that the EC Directorate General for External Relations prepare a brief manual setting out in a simple and clear way the procedures to be followed and the requirements. The manual would also provide guidelines on how to present a proposal to the Directorate. A sample outline of this manual could be as follows:

I. The Preparation of a Project Proposal

1. Documentation required (policy statements, background, objectives, justification, etc)
2. Costs and their presentation,
3. Format(s) for technical and financial documents.

II. EC Procedures and Regulations

1. Personnel and Staffing

   2.1 Who can be employed (non EC expatriates),
   2.2 Procedures for cost calculation
   2.3 Cost control (documentation to be produced).

2. Financial Requirements

   2.1 Minimum accounting needs (chart of accounts, and accounting system)
   2.2 Basic documentation (work plans, budgets, cash flows)
   2.3 Bank accounts (use and conditions)

3. Reporting

   3.1 Timing of reports
   3.2 Content and format of reports (interim, final)
   3.3 Performance data, objectives and targets

4. Payment Procedures

   4.1 How to present a request,
   4.2 Advances (at the beginning, at the end of each reporting period and justification),
   4.3 EC procedure and estimated timing of payments.

5. EC Financial Rules and Contracts

   5.1 Abstract of the major rules applying to the signatories (i.e. bid procedures, limits of expenditures, etc.)
   5.2 Forms and conditions of contracts

4.4 Finance and Financial Management

4.4.1 Sources of Finance and Role of Solidarité Afghanistan, Belgium

160. As indicated in the previous chapter under Project Budgets and Financial Requirements, there are two financing sources, the EC which provides 87.5 per cent of funds, and other organisations which provide the balance of 12.5 per cent. The latter group includes a number of third party donors such as USAID, UNHCR, Swedish and Norwegian Committees, and NGO's. The participation of each of these

donors varies with the project, ranging from none for teacher training and apprenticeship projects to a maximum of 39.7 per cent for the MRCA. The importance of EC financing is therefore confirmed as being essential to the existence of the overall programme.

161. The role of the Representative Organization (SAB), even though an official new contract has not yet been signed, is crucial for:

(a) the follow up of the approval of the proposed contract extension ;

(b) the receipt of all payments issued by the EC;

(c) the timely transfer of funds both to the NGOs' Headquarters and the field to allow the smooth operation of the projects and functioning of the ITC centre;

162. The modalities for the execution of all the above tasks are governed by both the EC contract and the cooperation agreement signed by the NGO's.

4.4.2 Accounting Procedures

Solidarité Afghanistan, Belgium, and Headquarters

163. Generally speaking, based on information acquired in Peshawar, the accounting procedures applied in the headquarters of the NGO's are fairly simple and straightforward, with varying degrees of analysis. Only SGAA presents an audited balance sheet. The controlling systems are simple and would benefit from the introduction of elementary tools which would provide the organisations with better information.

164. With reference to Solidarité Afghanistan, the visit to its headquarters in Liège,[29] provided an insight into its accounting procedures. An accounting firm has been hired to prepare a detailed chart of accounts for general accounting purposes as well as an analytical accounting system. Both are based on the Belgian national system. The use of such a system would require the employment of an accountant and would be justifiable only if the total accounting of ITC were to be kept in Liège and if the degree of analysis required by the EC greatly increased.

165. Taking into consideration the suggestions included in this report, it may not be appropriate to implement such a system which would also have the disadvantage of requiring all field documents to be sent to Liège for processing and preparation of the report, and then sent back to Peshawar for approval by the local EC representative, causing further delays in the submission process.

Accounting Procedures in ITC

166. A review of the accounting system and procedures in ITC revealed a number of different approaches by the projects to handling accounts, ranging from a simple cash bank book to basic but complete classical accounting systems operated manually or by computer. All the systems have had, as a primary aim, to fulfil the requirements of the various donors. Therefore the formats and the charts of accounts are also different and vary in complexity. One implication of the existence of several donors can be seen in the number of bank accounts (both convertible and non-convertible), that each project operates with a resultant excessive level of banking charges. The procedures used for accounting entries for all projects were examined and, considering the means available and the scope, they may be considered sufficient.

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[29]. 3rd June 1991

167. The mission noted that:

(a) the requirements of the different donors have, in some cases, necessitated the duplication of operations and/or reporting formats;

(b) there is not always consistency between budgets and accounts in the allocation of expenditures;

(c) there is no consistent internal control;

(d) due to the limited administrative structure of each project, there is no separation between the functions of certification, approval, authorisation and payment;

(e) the time required for the normal recording of accounting entries is a small part of the total working time of the accountants who are, therefore, utilised for other tasks, in some cases incompatible with their accounting duties (eg cashier).

Current Financial and Management Reporting Procedures

168. At present the internal reporting procedures for EC financial and management purposes are not clearly known and mainly left to the ITC Coordinator's discretion. The procedures followed for the two types of reporting are slightly different and outlined below:

169. **Financial Reporting**. This is initiated by the ITC coordinator who:

(a) fills in the figures of the funds available at the beginning of the reporting period, for each project, in the "Balance on...." column of the financial report form (EC model, see Annex B);

(b) sends the form to each project in turn. Each project

- completes columns 5, 6 and 8 for the field expenditures;

- prepares an explanatory note for those items for which variations over the budget are recorded due to over or under expenditure;

- returns both the form and the comments to the ITC Coordinator.

(c) completes the financial report form with the European expenditures as supplied, in a summary format, by Solidarité Afghanistan headquarters;

170. **Management Reporting**. At the request of the ITC Coordinator, each project

(a) prepares a list of information, providing a number of summarised data related to the reporting period, grouped under the following headings:

- outputs
- indicators
- current problems
- proposed measures to rectify;

(b) prepares a "field narrative report" describing the major activities carried out during the period;

(c) forwards both documents to the ITC Coordinator for inclusion in the general report.

171. The ITC coordinator having received all above documentation:

(a) prepares the "Intermediary Report" to be submitted to the EC;

(b) transmits the summarised data to Solidarité Afghanistan, Belgium;

(c) forwards it to the EC Representative in Peshawar for final approval with copy to EC Brussels.

172. Solidarité Afghanistan, Belgium

(a) calculates the European expenditures and forwards them to the ITC Coordinator;

(b) prepares a Working Plan for the period, which is actually a summary budget for the period, and forwards it to the ITC Coordinator;

(c) prepares the formal letter of transmission to the EC and forwards it to the ITC Coordinator in Peshawar.

173. A number of issues are raised in respect of these procedures. These are set out below.

(a) the lack of uniformity in the accounting systems may cause errors and delays in the preparation of the financial report;

(b) the non-availability of the justifying documentation for European expenditures does not allow the local EC Representative to approve fully the report;

(c) the need for a formal letter from Solidarité Afghanistan, Belgium, to transmit formally the report to the EC Peshawar, causes an undue delay in the submission;

(d) not all summarised information/indicators are easily understandable and fully explained (see Chapter 5);

(e) it is not possible to gain a clear picture of the progress of the project because no accumulated data are available (see Chapter 5).

4.4.3 Proposed Management Procedures

174. This section sets out suggestions for the improvement of financial procedures based on discussions in Peshawar with interested parties. The purpose of the suggestions is to seek ways to

(a) rationalise and make more effective the management and financial system;

(b) maintain a level of unsophisticated but effective accounting and management;

(c) reduce costs in the long run;

(d) make better use of the available equipment and capabilities;

(e) provide relevant and easily understandable information;

(f) allow for an evaluation of the projects as a whole at a given time;

(g) try to separate some of the functions of certification, approval, authorisation and payment;

(h) give uniformity and flexibility to the accounting system and avoid/reduce duplications;

(i) make better use of the ITC as a possible "Service Centre" for the projects housed;

175. In order to achieve these objectives, the following steps are suggested. The steps are discussed in detail in subsequent paragraphs, and are taken in conjunction with proposed management improvements discussed above and proposed management reporting improvements set out in Chapter 5.

(a) introduction of a uniform and subsequently centralised accounting system in ITC;

(b) introduction of monthly work plans covering the reporting period and monthly budgets and cash flows for the work plans;

(c) the recruitment of a consultant who is fully conversant with European accounting systems and computer use should be considered to prepare, install and make operational a centralised accounting system, train the personnel and help build up a more effective management system;

(d) simplification of the budget preparation for new projects;

(e) EC to consider the possibility of changing the way of calculation of the advances from a per cent based formula to formula based on a given number of months, preferably nine months in this case, in order to make up for the unavoidable procedural delay in the approval and payment of each end of period report.

Uniform and Centralized Accounting System

176. As mentioned above, at present accounting is kept in a variety of ways and with different degrees of analysis.

177. In talking to all interested parties, the need to reach uniformity, at least in the format and as much as possible in the chart of accounts, was apparent. The proposed format, together with an explanation of the working concepts is attached in Annex B. As the majority of the projects are equipped with computers and Lotus/Quattro spreadsheets are extensively used it is suggested that use be made of these programmes to construct a journal/ledger type of accounting system having the following goals.

(a) simplicity of use;

(b) avoiding repetition of entries;

(c) reducing the risk of errors by automating as much as possible the calculation and transfer of data;

(d) flexibility to allow the use of the system also for other requirements;

(e) providing up-to-date information about total expenditures by budget line and budget balance;

178. The system was discussed with all the project representatives and accepted, with the assumption that any agreed centralisation in ITC would be delayed because of time constraints related to the length of the current contract. These constraints include the time required for development; installation; the organisational changes required at the level of each project and in ITC; and the feeling of a loss, to some degree, of NGO autonomy due to the yet undefined role and powers of a strengthened the central

management function. As an interim measure to be applied immediately it was agreed to unify the chart of accounts using as a base the sub-heads of the budget.

Monthly Forecasts

179. Part of the financial problem encountered by the projects arises from the absence of a detailed monthly forecast of activities and, as consequence, of the expenditures to be sustained during the short term. Discussions in Peshawar have resulted in agreement on the need to have a forecasting system which can:

(a) provide information on the short run, both in quantity and in value;

(b) allow for a better use of available resources;

(c) allow the programming of financial needs;

(d) permit the timely transfer of funds;

(e) reduce banking and transfer fees.

180. The introduction, for each reporting period, of three programming documents was therefore suggested and accepted:

(1) A monthly work plan expressed in units to be achieved (i.e. number of trainees, number of surgeries etc). The exact units would be established by each project in relation to their own needs and objectives and would also be related to the goals and targets of each project (see Chapter 5);

(2) A monthly budget of the expenditures to be paid in relation to the work plan;

(3) A monthly cash flow of the budgeted expenditures (see Annex B for a proposed model).

181. The above documents would be useful not only for financial purposes but also for comparison and monitoring of the progress of each project. For instance, the monthly work plan could be partly used to reflect targets; the monthly budget would provide a basis for comparison of data with the Financial Report form requested by the EC; and the consolidated monthly cash flow would be useful for Solidarité Afghanistan, Belgium, to follow up the overall financial situation.

182. The underlying principle in the preparation of the above documentation is the need for constant updating by replacing estimates with actual data once the month is over and extending the rolling period to keep a permanent six months forecast (ie. once one month is over and after the update it is dropped and a new one is added at the end). The work plan format could, where possible, be expressed in bar chart form which would reveal the existence of overflows and/or availability of resources in the time frame considered.

Consultant to Set Up the System

183. In order to implement the above mentioned suggestions once they have been endorsed both by the EC and the NGO's, it would be necessary to recruit someone well conversant with accounting procedures, computerisation, training, cost analysis and fluent both in French and English. From discussions it appears that no such person is available in the ITC or projects.

184. The major tasks of the consultant would be:

motivation of the individuals in them have been entirely respected, and in no sense was the exercise, of which this report is the output, presented or conducted as an audit.

5. It should also be noted that mission objectives were also process-oriented. A good deal of time was spent in discussions with individuals and groups in the ITC about particular technical issues which face them and how best to deal with them. A number of initiatives were started during the period of the mission which will without doubt contribute to the achievement of many of the goals set out in this report.

Evaluation of Professional Activities

6. In view of the specialist nature of the disparate organisations based in the ITC which were not reflected entirely in the skills of the visiting team, this evaluation is not concerned explicitly with detailed judgements on their professional activities. Professional activities refer to issues of prosthesis, dentistry or curriculum development, for example, rather than management and administration issues. Each of these would be the subject of a deep investigation taking into account all the professional issues involved, which, it will be seen, are legion; and on the other hand it has to be accepted that the evaluation of output would be very difficult to achieve because of linguistic and geographical considerations, particularly as a good part of the trainees actually work inside Afghanistan. Evaluation of the non-health training activities which are based on the Centre are made difficult, for example, because of (a) language barriers – materials and instruction are in Pashtu or Dari; (b) impossibility of verifying data on the eventual occupations and activities of ex-trainees.

7. It is, however, possible to make judgements of a broad nature and to attempt an analysis of major strengths and weaknesses. These judgements are based on (a) the views of others outside the Centre but involved in the same issues; (b) responses to questions on policy and awareness of the project environments; (c) evaluations of the professional competence of the staff, both expatriate, and non-expatriate (who are mostly Afghan); and (d) reference to external and internal evaluations which have already been undertaken. Members of the team also undertook field visits to schools and workshops in order to gain first hand, if limited, experience of conditions of field-based training.

8. It is also possible to consider the issues of quality, efficiency and relevance of each of the programmes and to set out the questions which more specialised professional evaluations should formally consider and on which conclusions might be reached. These issues can be evaluated in the light of potential opportunity and financial costs and benefits at the margin. These are essential tools of policy making and planning.

Policy, Planning, Management and Administration

9. It is possible, then, to arrive at conclusions on the capacity of the participating NGO's, either in themselves or as a group, to generate professional policy, make plans, manage and administer their programmes in as efficient manner as possible. It is reasonable to suppose that a project with unclear objectives, and in which a professional debate about what it is supposed to be doing is not obviously in progress, is either unlikely to be working well or in danger of deteriorating: in contrast a project supported by vigorous self-questioning and an obvious awareness of the right questions to ask has a good chance of proceeding on the right lines even though operational and environmental difficulties may be considerable.

10. Proper management is indispensable to proper professional discussion. Issues of opportunity cost cannot be conceived in the absence of knowledge about resource use and alternatives. A system which is muddled in its administration may be muddled in its professional aims, while a system which is

189. The advantages of this system include assured liquidity during the report processing time; the availability of projected data related to the execution of the project; and the possibility of controlling the progress of the activities in relation with their goals.

4.4.4 Costs of the Suggested Changes

190. The above suggested changes would entail a certain amount of extra costs unforeseen at the moment of the original preparation of the submission. The cost for the programme manager post might be higher than that of the ITC Coordinator and an adjustment would need to be made to the budget. The cost of the consultant should also be estimated and added.

191. If the suggestions are accepted by the EC, it would be necessary for Solidarité Afghanistan, Belgium, to prepare a costed proposal indicating also the time frame within which each suggestion should be acted upon, to be included in an addendum to the contract. It is not expected that the costs for these items would be taken from the submitted original project.

4.5 Conclusions

192. Issues of management systems should not be confused with institutional arrangements. There are many ways in which improvements can be effected, and some options have been discussed in this report. Whatever options in respect of programme management are eventually adopted, it appeared to the mission that there was general agreement that all the NGO's would benefit from strengthening management, financial and reporting systems. The principal tasks which need to be undertaken, irrespective of decisions relating to central support services and how they are managed are as follows:

(a) Institutionalisation of an improved planning system, starting with policy and programme plans and leading to detailed work plans with implementation schedules and bar-charts as well as budgets and cash flows subject to monthly up-dating (see below);

(b) Rationalisation of accounting procedures and charts of accounts. These are discussed in detail in the next section;

(c) Agreement on reporting framework which covers non-financial (see Chapter 5) and financial data (see below);

(d) Agreement on the EC financing modalities.

CHAPTER 5

MONITORING AND EVALUATION

5.1 Introduction

193. This chapter sets out the main issues surrounding the monitoring and evaluation of the project, including reporting and management information. There has been some misunderstanding in the project about the purpose and processes of monitoring and evaluation, and the use of performance data. During the mission a number of discussions were held with all parties, including the office of the EC Refugee Coordinator, and it is hoped that further dialogue and thought about this issue has been initiated.

194. This chapter sets out a broad outline of the kind of information which is required, but, as with all other suggestions in this report, the mission wishes to stress that the final responsibility for development of appropriate measures of performance must lie with each NGO. This chapter may therefore be regarded as a basis for discussion out of which may emerge entirely new and better approaches than those considered by the mission.

5.2 Aspects of Monitoring and Evaluation

195. Before proceeding to consider some details about performance data and approaches to monitoring the progress of the various programmes, it is useful to consider the *purpose* of monitoring and evaluation (M&E). Evaluation can be 'illuminative', such as this report, with the purpose of providing greater understanding of issues and encouraging focused internal discussion; or it can be concerned with specific recommendations about the success or failure of programmes. The objective of M&E must be to provide feedback which will enable improvements and adjustments to be made, as well as allowing external parties to judge progress. There is a clear relationship between management information systems (MIS) and M&E. It is often useful to to consider *key* areas, that is, areas which account for the major (> 60 per cent, for example) volume of work. Anything that affects these areas is likely to to affect all other areas.

196. The NGO's have three basic M&E needs:

(a) Regular monitoring of progress at calendar periods (monthly, bi-monthly; six monthly, etc);

(b) Monitoring training cycles on completion;

(c) Cumulative information over longer periods.

197. M&E documentation will include statistical and financial performance data in summary form and narrative detail. All data should have a clear meaning, and thus be related to norms, previous performance or targets, or all three. There has been a tendency to present data in absolute isolation and its purpose has been unclear to all parties. There has also been a tendency to present *too much* data. It is proposed that the current emphasis on quantitative indicators is reduced and that they are more focused.[30]

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[30] For example, in current reports 'outputs' and 'indicators' are both sometimes synonymous with data on the volume of current activities.

198. A further value of M&E is that it can act as a stimulus to considering alternatives. Within any given policy it is possible to achieve goals in another way than that currently practised. These alternatives should be exhaustively explored and documented in the form of brief discussion papers which can be brought for reconsideration at later dates. The next section discusses performance data (though see Chapter 4 for financial data) and the processes by which they may be collected and used.

5.3 Performance Data

199. Each programme should have quantified targets, and should be clear about qualitative issues. It is not sufficient to train people: they should by *well-trained. Norms* relate to optimum use of facilities, equipment and staff, and where possible the programme managers should be able to specify these. An operating team can be expected to undertake a certain number of operations per unit of time: if it performs less, then it is underemployed. So many orthopaedic devices can be reasonably expected per worker per unit of time. Trainers and supervisors should in general have a full day's work, and their daily targets should reflect this.

200. Norms may equate to targets, but not always. This is the significance of the discussions in Chapter 3 about increasing numbers of trainees. Unless actual numbers or trainees are related to numbers of *possible* trainees there is no way of knowing whether capacity is being utilised efficiently. But the number of possible trainees is constrained by (a) demand for their skills: it is undesirable to train people who will not find work; (b) quality considerations: more trainees might be possible but the quality of training will suffer. When analysing performance in relation to norms and targets *variations* are key data: how far to actual out-turns vary from targets. These variations can often be expressed as a positive or negative percentage.

201. **Efficiency**. There are two types of efficiency in which a training evaluator is interested. First, *internal efficiency* is concerned with the relationship of inputs and outputs to resources. Second, *external efficiency* is concerned with post-training performance – was it all worth while, are trainees doing what they were trained to do and doing it well. Both types of measure are concerned both with quality and quantity, yielding the need for both *qualitative* and *quantitative* performance targets and data.

Regular Reporting Stage Data (Peshawar)

202. The NGO's hold regular meetings every two months with the EC Refugee Coordinator to review progress. These meetings have been partly based on 'indicators'. In that the meetings do not necessarily coincide with training cycles, meaningful indicators have been difficult to define. However, the following are relevant:

(a) for training programmes, the number of trainees, specifying the month of training, numbers who started, and expected completion date of training;

(b) for training programmes the utilisation of staff. This could be expressed in instructor-student contact hours, or simply in terms of the components of a contact hour calculation: number of periods and number of students per instructor. This information gives a feel for the *volume* of training activity, and should be compared to previous periods as well as to targets. ASYAR has a more difficult task, but in any given period there is a number of 'committed' total trainee months (number of trainees multiplied by *total* length of each course) and a number of masters. It could also be useful to indicate ***key*** areas: attendance in the five main trades, for example.

(c) for training programmes during a period in which stage examinations (as opposed to final examinations) have taken place, average marks or other evaluation criteria with an assessment (in supporting text) of quality of trainee;

(d) for medical interventions currently used data are useful, though they should be related to norms/targets. The number of bed nights in itself is impossible to interpret without knowing the number of beds, and does not show the number of different patients who use the beds. The absolute number of X-ray photographs cannot be interpreted without knowing either how many photographs a machine can take in a period or how many photographs were targeted. In other words, if targets/norms are made specific, *variations* from these can be identified and explained;

(e) for all types of programme the current demand for places can be assessed: the length of waiting lists or other measures of need. This enables the activities of the projects to be understood in relationship to *demand*: most (not all) of the indicators currently used relate to *supply*;

(f) for production processes such as SGAA's there is no problem in producing data on period outputs as the process is on-going. Numbers of appliances fitted per period, however, should be compared both with targets and with past performance: is the production process becoming more or less efficient? Are there changes in the patterns of production (more AK and less BK, for example)? How does production output relate to the person hours which went into the output: in absolute terms output figures cannot be related to inputs unless some performance datum such as average hours per appliance can be derived;

(g) Particular policies should be monitored regularly, particularly those relating to vulnerable groups. Is access to women and girls improving?

203. At the same time as deriving this type of data regular reporting stages should also be concerned with policy. Reporting should *mean something* to those who are presenting the reports as well as those who are receiving them. Report stages should be used as opportunities to reflect on key issues, to raise heads and look above the daily concerns. In order to facilitate this, the regular meetings in Peshawar with the EC Coordinator could be focused on particular key issues rather than trying to cover all issues. Many of the issues raised in this report could form the subject of these meetings, and reports could be prepared in advance which focus on providing particular sorts of information, rather than all information. At the end of a year most aspects would have been dealt with in depth, providing a body of information which can be used for reports to the funding agency. Issues could include:

(a) Qualitative aspects of training;
(b) External efficiency – monitoring of ex-trainees;
(c) Vulnerable groups;
(d) Costs;
(e) Management;
(f) Alternatives to current programmes – are there other things that the NGO's might try?

End of Cycle Data

204. When a training cycle ends relevant summary data should be put together. These could include:

(a) Number started and completed;

(b) costs per completer: can these be reduced?

(c) Destination of graduates (if available);

(d) Brief statement of competencies achieved (what did they learn and how do we know they learnt it?)

(e) Any qualitative issues (how could training be improved?);

(f) Any policy issues (should the same course be given again?);

(g) Comparison to previous groups.

205. The reporting format could thus be based on the following structure, bearing always in mind the *need to relate data to norms and/or targets*. Where appropriate *cumulative* data should be regularly reported as a reminder of the historical impact of the project:

(1) **Current Activities**

Training

- nr of trainees etc, as above.
- courses under way
- examination and assessment results
- waiting lists

Medical

- patients under treatment
- waiting lists

(2) **Outputs in the Reporting Period**

Training

- graduates and courses completed
- training staff utilisation
- costs per completer (where possible)
- external efficiency

Medical

- patients discharged
- operations etc performed
- bed nights etc
- staff utilisation

Production

- numbers of appliances
- person hours per appliance
- average production costs

206. This list is not exhaustive, but care should be exercised in adding to it. The main purpose in presenting it is to encourage deeper thought about the reasons for wanting performance data and the need for criteria against which to measure them. There is no doubt in the minds of the members of the mission that the NGOs' field staff are well able to develop the kinds of information systems they can find useful once it is clear that performance data and criteria are not examinations in themselves, part of an overall inquisitorial process, but useful in achieving the goals to which NGO staff have volunteered to devote themselves to achieving. It is suggested that over the next few months proposals are presented for relevant performance data and that ensuing discussions ask of each datum what is it for? why do we want it? what does it really mean? and how should it be used?

Reports to EC
207. Formal reports to the EC are principally, but not exclusively, concerned with budget monitoring. The number of performance data should be restricted to key data, derived from the above and supported by brief narrative. It is not suggested that the foregoing paragraphs apply to EC reporting, but information therein generated will be available and should be catalogued in the EC report as a useful project output.

208. The summarised data currently presented in a tabular format and attached to the periodic report, while providing an overview of some of the activities carried out during the reporting period, do not give any information on the progress of the project with respect to the estimated objectives. Also the data provided in the tables are not always relevant and could create confusion. It has been proposed to try and prepare a format based on the following principles:

(a) the situation for the period and the progress of the project;

(b) the justification, where possible, of the resources used;

(c) the results of the activities carried out;

(d) the monitoring of the graduated trainees and/or the activities.

209. Annex B includes a sample table prepared for the ASYAR/TTC project in which the horizontal part corresponds to principle (a) above, columns 3 to 5 to principle (b), columns 6 to 8 to principle (c) and the last five columns to principle (d).

210. In order to give uniformity of format to the different projects under his supervision, the local EC Representative is considering a standard reporting format, both for interim and final reports, which also reflects the above mentioned principles (see Annex B).

Self Evaluation
211. Most of the projects, as has been noted in this report, have undertaken, organised to be undertaken or been the subject of technical evaluations. Self evaluation is greatly to be encouraged, and it should be possible to organise this at minimal cost. The headquarters of the NGO's are in a position to seek assistance for evaluation exercises. In preparing evaluation proposals great care should be taken to establish clear and focused terms of reference in order to obtain the best value. These could be discussed with the local EC Refugee Coordinator as well as in house and the final reports presented to EC and other interested bodies.

212. A lack of evaluation has been noted in the management area. The NGO's should be encouraged to seek assistance in evaluating their management procedures and information systems, and for the most part these are not complex. A further area for internal evaluation is in the area of external efficiency and the evaluation of outcomes. There is already a good deal of activity in this area on the part of all the NGO's, though in some cases it is more *ad hoc* than in others. Again, evaluation criteria should be clearly described.

5.4 Conclusions

213. This chapter has set out key issues of monitoring and evaluation. They should be read in conjunction with the remarks in chapter 4 in relation to financial reporting. The generation of performance data only makes sense if the NGO's themselves appreciate the purpose of the data and their value as feedback into the project managements. The crucial areas of average cost, number of trainees and quality of training can only be understood and relevant action taken in the light of data gathered over time

which can be compared to relevant norms and targets. Once this concept is understood the rest should fall easily into place.

ANNEX A

Terms of Reference

WITH COMPLIMENTS

FROM

ARIC

ACBAR Resource & Information Céntre

ANNEX B

Accounting System Brief

concerned with good administration may make perception and improvement of its professional activities easier.

11. In summary, then, this evaluation seeks to emphasise the awareness of the evaluators themselves of the importance of the professional goals of the organisations and projects under evaluation. It does not seek to place undue stress on management and administrative issues as ends in themselves, but only in so far as improvement of management and administration services enables professional staff to proceed with their duties more efficiently. The evaluators are fully aware of the importance that the participating NGO's attach to their professional autonomy, and that they are accountable to their own organisations, not to a central organisation, for the implementation of their policies.

12. The ITC is intended to be the base of a homogeneous and logical framework for a unified external financing system. The European Commission (EC) will thus be anxious to be assured that its funds are properly used and accounted for. Such funding would be unlikely to be available to the NGOs' separate programmes. The convenience of the ITC building, which may be considered in the same light as a Science Park or Business Park such as are found in a number of countries around the world, often attached to universities, is that it provides an attractive and supportive environment for disparate groups to achieve a common general goal, and in doing so must be seen to assist them to achieve this goal more efficiently than if they existed in separate locations.

13. At the same time the NGO's policies and goals may be expected to be in harmony with the EC's refugee policy environment in view of the fact that their programmes will, for the most part, be almost entirely funded by the EC. It is not expected that conflicts of interest will arise: rather it is expected that possibilities of closer and longer term relations will be explored.

Structure of Report

14. This report addresses the Terms of Reference precisely. Chapter 2 considers the current policies of the Government of Pakistan (GOP), the UNHCR, other organisations and the EC on the Afghan refugee situation in Pakistan, and analyses the implications of the views of the future as expressed by representatives of those organisations (TOR 2.1, 2.2(4)).

15. Chapter 3 considers the project in brief detail (TOR 2.3(3)). Each of the NGO's current programmes is described and considered in terms of their quality, efficiency and relevance. Options on future strategies are set out (TOR 2.3(5)) and cost and finance issues briefly explored. Cost structures are simply analysed in order to encourage more serious analysis by the organisations themselves, and costs are as far as possible related to benefits (TOR 2.3(9)). Conclusions are drawn suggesting priority actions for each project (TOR 2.3(2)).

16. Chapter 4 is concerned with the whole range of policy, planning, management, administration and staffing of the Centre and its constituent organisations, both in Pakistan and in Europe (TOR 2.2, 2.3(6)). It also analyses financial control and accounting systems and procedures and proposes approaches to strengthening them where necessary. It sets out terms of reference on which the participating NGO's may base a discussion about rationalising and making more efficient the Centre's management without in any way effecting their professional autonomy. The team urges that these discussions be completed as quickly as possible in order that agreed measures may be introduced. Chapter 5 examines the monitoring and evaluation procedures of the NGOs' programmes and suggests possible improvements to these (TOR 2.3(7)).

17. This report is intended to be of use to two groups: on the one hand, in view of the mission's positive conclusions on the essential value of the NGOs' work, it is hoped that it will encourage the resolve of the

EC to engage in this type of funding in spite of difficulties and constraints inherent in it; and on the other hand it is intended that those sections of the report which deal in technical and professional matters will provide a useful basis on which the NGO's may focus internal policy and management discussions. Points which are raised in specific relation to individual NGO's are usually relevant to all the NGO's. It is recommended that each NGO reads the whole document rather than restricting attention only to those parts which appear relevant from the contents list!

CHAPTER 2

CURRENT REFUGEE SITUATION AND THE FUTURE

2.1 Introduction

18. This chapter provides an overview of the current state of thinking in Peshawar on the Afghan refugee situation, and is intended to provide the background to the project required by the TOR. First, the overall situation is discussed; and second, the EC Article B7-302 concerning aid towards the self-sufficiency for refugees is related to the activities.

2.2 Current Refugee Situation

19. There have been rapid changes in the situation over the last few months, largely stimulated by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees' (UNHCR's) evolving policy of seeking solutions to the refugee problem in terms of either repatriation to Afghanistan or of integration in Pakistan, and the Government of Pakistan's growing concern about the continued presence of between 2 and 3 million refugees.[2] Two of the main institutions involved are the UNHCR and the Committee for Afghan Refugees (CAR), which is headed by a Commissioner appointed by the Government of Pakistan (GOP). In addition there are a number of powerful bi-lateral committees, in particular the Swedish Committee, which are involved in most sectors.

20. After the withdrawal of Russian troops from Afghanistan it was widely expected that a rapid voluntary repatriation of refugees would take place. This did not transpire, and as a result there is considerable internal debate among the organisations involved as to whether their own presence and programmes are contributing to this apparent static situation. At the same time greater realism has started to prevail: it is accepted that, even were the rate of voluntary repatriation to rise, a certain level of local settlement and a continuing need to provide local support are indicated over the next three to five years. To a large extent this view is reinforced by the perception that the absorptive capacity of Afghanistan itself will be limited for some time to come. Agriculture is in ruins; large-scale rural mining inhibits mobility and local development; transport facilities are weak; and security remains uncertain. Even were a 'political' solution to emerge these problems would remain for some years.

21. <u>UNHCR</u>. UNHCR policy is thus in the process of adjustment, with the goal of 'solving' the refugee problem in the next two or three years. In this context, the concept of a 'solution' is not intended, it appears, to signify that no Afghans will remain on Pakistani soil: it is rather intended to imply that responsibility for those who remain would be transferred to local institutions. UNHCR aims to reduce its own involvement.

22. In particular, the UNHCR policy appears to envisage three categories of action. First, a small but significant annual rate of voluntary repatriation is hoped for, encouraged by cash and wheat subsidies, running to perhaps as many as 300,000 refugees per year over the next three years. This is viewed with some scepticism by some of the other agencies. Second, for those who remain, the main targeting will be

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2. There appears to be considerable uncertainty about the total number of refugees: an accurate census is impracticable and the reliability of registration data is low. UNHCR planning includes further investigations into numbers, which it now believes may be over-estimated.

towards vulnerable groups – widows, disabled and others who will lack access to the labour market. Thirdly, a rationalisation is envisaged of overall policies towards Afghan refugees which would include, *inter alia*

(a) a refocusing away from care and maintenance towards development assistance;

(b) a transfer of responsibilities to the Government of Pakistan;

(c) reduced emphasis on the augmentation and improvement of infrastructure;

(d) a deeper questioning of cross-border assistance.

23. Government of Pakistan. A number of important questions arise from the foregoing policy developments, apart from the lack of certainty about any kind of political solution in Afghanistan. Among these is the issue of the capacity of established GOP institutions to take over responsibility. The GOP believes that NGO's will play an important part in smoothing the transition period as UNHCR reduces the volume of its assistance. Another is the effect of the refugee presence on the labour market, particularly in the low skilled sectors, in NWFP. These two are inter-related.

24. Although UNHCR works with and to a large extent under GOP, much of its work has been concerned with NGO's which have a wide variety of agendas. For the most part, all refugee related issues have not been integrated into GOP institutional structures, although many of the problems which have arisen have had a significant effect on the Pakistani population. One effect of the rapid withdrawal of refugee-oriented aid would be a rise in local unemployment: the CAR reports the loss of 2,000 Pakistani jobs last year and predicts the same for this year. At the same time, the continuing presence of training and employment programmes for Afghans in Pakistan aimed at integration of Afghans in the local community has a considerable opportunity cost for unskilled and poor Pakistanis. The global problem in reality concerns poverty and related effects of the war in Afghanistan on all the population in NWFP (and, of course, other provinces affected). If and as the refugees return and the volume of refugee-related activity is reduced there may be a net negative effect on the economy in Pakistan, an effect which would not have been expected had there been no Afghan conflict.

2.3 Refugee Policy of the European Commission

25. It is useful at this point to consider the broad issues set out above, which only scratch the analytical surface but which it is hoped summarise usefully the substance of the policy debate, in the light of the EC's policy. This is set out in Article B7-302[3] entitled Aid towards self-sufficiency for refugees, displaced persons and other population groups who have left their countries of origin or residence. This section, which anticipates the description of the project in Chapter 3, verifies the extent to which the projects qualify for financing under the Article at present.

26. The intention of the policy is to provide an intermediate framework for follow-up of emergency relief and to deal with integration and settlement in the phase before development issues are addressed.[4] The main purpose is to improve living conditions of refugees and displaced persons and support permanent solutions, with an emphasis on interventions which have self-sufficiency as their goals. The projects in ITC Hyatabad, as has been noted, are entirely concerned with displaced persons, defined as a

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3. Dated Brussels 26th Feb 1991.

4. Articles B7-5000 and B7-3000 respectively. B7-3000 is framed by bilateral agreements between the EC and recipient states.

person who has been obliged for political or by reason of natural disaster to leave home. Afghan displaced persons may be categorised in at least two groups: those who are obliged to remain in camps or elsewhere outside Afghanistan (refugees), and those who have, for one reason or another, remained inside the country but who have been dislocated by the war (displaced persons). In reality, there appears to have been a constant flow between Pakistan and Afghanistan of men both to fight and to attempt some husbandry in their places of origin. By definition, the objective of self-sufficiency implies either preparation for employment and integration into the host country, or preparation for return. Return would be out of the question were basic facilities and security not available. In short, the concepts described in Article B7-302 are complex in their definition and application, but include the types of activity financed by the ITC projects, whether they be aimed at training for return to Afghanistan, for temporary or permanent integration in Pakistan, or for the provision of basic rights of education and health to refugees.

2.4 Conclusion

27. There is a continuing role for agencies to smooth the transition period in view of the rapid timetable set by the UNHCR. This will require that greater emphasis be placed on high quality policy development and related planning to enable the NGO's in ITC to respond rapidly with appropriate lead-times to these changing circumstances. In general, therefore, although in the UNHCR context there may appear to be a time limit after which the situation ceases to be 'officially' a refugee problem, in reality considerable need will remain to provide assistance in various forms to the most seriously affected groups.

28. The ITC programme fits well into the framework of Article B7-302. It is further suggested that the scope of the project be considered over the longer period in order to encourage a long term perspective and concomitant policy development among the NGO's. It is in the interest of all parties that experience gained in such a complex and difficult field should not be lost, particularly as the record of the project is successful and likely to become more so.

29. The main operational conclusion relates to the need for the NGO's and the EC to reach a clearer mutual understanding about policies and objectives. If, as appears likely, the current situation will continue for another three years or more, although certain aspects will change as political discussions evolve in Afghanistan and in Peshawar, the need for the NGO's to be able to plan within a secure planning framework is imperative. Policy and planning are discussed in more detail later in this report, and should be developed in partnership with the EC in order that each organisation understands the goals of the other. In particular, NGO's need to understand the implications of receiving EC funding. The EC makes funds available to implement EC policy for the benefit to displaced persons and refugees. It will thus be the case that NGO policy is subject to review by the EC to confirm its compatibility with EC policy.

30. **Perspective Plan**. It is suggested that, perhaps under the umbrella of SAB, a perspective plan be drawn up which specifically relates NGO goals to EC funding support, and the appropriate mechanisms are defined. Some of these mechanisms relating to the project time frame and financing patterns are described in this report. Formal TOR for the elaboration of the plan should be drawn up. These would include statements of EC policy as well as NGO policies for the future; outline statements of NGO intentions in regard to the Centre; and broad financing commitments.

31. **Future of the ITC Building**. If the above analysis of the situation is correct, the issue of the future of the ITC building should be clear for the next few years. The mission has not examined the precise terms of the agreement between the EC and GOP relating to the future of the building, but it is understood that while the NGO/EC project continues the building will remain in its current use. However, the eventual hand-over of the building to GOP renders it all the more important that NGO intentions in regard

to the time frame they envisage for transfers of their activities out of the building are included in the perspective plan.

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Directorate General for External Relations

Project NA/AR/18/89

VOCATIONAL TRAINING FOR AFGHAN REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN

PROJECT EVALUATION

19 June 1991

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ANNEXES

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

1. This report is the product of a mission to Peshawar, Pakistan, which took place between May 16th and May 31st 1991, to evaluate the Integrated Training Centre (ITC) in Hyatabad. The construction of the building was financed by the EC and six NGO's, which are currently based in the building, have put forward a proposal for funding of their programmes, which are all concerned with Afghan refugees, to the EC, under Article B7-302. The mission's TOR were broadly to (a) consider the work of the NGO's within the context of the current refugee situation; (b) evaluate the suitability of the programmes for EC funding; (c) consider and make recommendations on the management of the Centre and the programmes.

The Current Refugee Situation

2. The mission concluded that, although the situation is rapidly changing after the withdrawal of Russian troops from Afghanistan, there is unlikely to be a significant reduction in refugee numbers over the next three years, although experience indicates the need for caution in forecasting. The work of the NGO's in the Centre is likely to remain necessary and important for the near future (Chapter 2).

The NGOs' Programmes

3. The evaluation of the programmes was favourable (Chapter 3), and they were judged to be externally efficient. The programmes are oriented to training of Afghans for self-sufficiency, and are concerned with displaced persons outside and inside Afghanistan. There are two training programmes for health workers (the Medical Training for Afghans (MTA) and the Medical Refresher Course for Afghans (MRCA)); an orthopaedic and physiotherapy training programme (Sandy Gall's Afghanisatan Appeal (SGAA); a programme for the training of primary school teachers (Teacher Training Centre (TTC) and Pedagogic Mobile Teams (PMT)) and training for apprentices (Apprenticeship for Young Afghan Refugees (ASYAR)), both under the NGO's SOS-PG/SAB. The overall coordination is assumed by Solidarité Afghanistan Belgique (SAB).

4. The report contains a number of suggestions and recommendations on each of the programmes. All of them are judged to be relevant to the needs of refugees and in harmony with EC refugee policy. They were considered to be responsive to the changing situation.

5. Particular suggestions included

- (a) Consideration of a reorientation of the teacher training programme;
- (b) Rationalisation of the apprenticeship programme and a move towards a clearer definition of goals and competencies;
- (c) Consideration of an increase in the number of trainees passing through the MTA and MRCA programmes without at the same time increasing fixed costs and some reorientation of their courses;
- (d) Measures to increase efficiency in the fabrication of orthopaedic appliances and the training of orthopaedic technicians and physiotherapists;
- (e) Consideration of ways of better achieving the programmes' goals in regard to vulnerable groups, in particular women.

Planning and Management

6. The mission made a number of recommendations and suggestions concerning the management of the programmes (Chapter 4). These can be grouped in four categories; (a) overall NGO management; (b) management at the individual NGO level in ITC; (c) management of common services in ITC; (d) NGO-EC relations.

7. **Overall NGO Management**. It is suggested that the NGO's consider ways in which they might strengthen the level of professional support to their operations in the field through a more focused and planned approach to self-evaluation and systems development, particularly management information development. It is also proposed that each NGO undertake a review of its policies on which to base plans for the coming years. This review would include its relations with the EC; policy towards ITC; and a more detailed consideration of goals, their relevance, and how they might be better achieved. The resulting documentation would stimulate valuable internal discussion and provide useful background and information for their own staff and donors.